Global governance and the United Nations system

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Security-community building for better global governance

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Introduction

This chapter attempts to shed light on another dimension of global governance by analysing why states build effective regional international organizations or regional security communities, the existence of which may ultimately help strengthen the UN system with the aim of promoting world peace. The approach taken here differs from that found in the mainstream literature (Adler and Barnett 1998; Weiss 1998; Alagappa and Inoguchi 1999), which tends to focus on one region and often fails to produce generalizations or to generate a coherent perspective on the subject matter (which has been a central aim of social science). A number of studies looking at specific countries or regions have offered rich insights into the problems of, and prospects for, future international governance at the regional level, but they do not tell us a great deal about why some regions are better at building communities whose members develop dependable expectations for peaceful change. This study is more ambitious than the existing literature in that it surveys regional security communities around the world and proposes that a comparative analysis of patterns of peace and security in the world's major regions (the Americas, Europe, Eurasia, Asia, Africa, and the Arab region) may shed more light on why some are more stable or peaceful than others. Still, such variation is meaningless unless we can systematically identify

key determinants to help explain why states in some regions are more able than others to create and maintain security communities.

The chapter is divided into three main sections. The next section (pp. 89–98) describes some of the great challenges to the efforts of the United Nations to promote global governance; it then argues that security-community building is a better way to global governance; finally, it develops four criteria for judging success and failure in such endeavours. Although (1) rich experience in conflict management and (2) small size of membership are important criteria for security-community building, it is shared (3) democratic values/performance and (4) political leadership that matter most. The section on pages 98–108 proves that success in security-community building in North America and Europe – mainly by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the EU, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), whereby the latter's geographic range is much broader – owes much to the fact that states in these regions have met most of the four criteria, especially democratic performance and political leadership. The section on pages 108–119 explains why states in the various non-Western or less-developed regions have proved themselves far less competent than their Western counterparts in regional community-building efforts – by the Organization of American States (OAS), the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the OAU (Organization of African Unity) – mainly because they have met fewer criteria, particularly those of democratic performance and political leadership.

The UN for global governance? A case for security-community building

The extent to which the United Nations can help promote international security and world peace is a matter of debate. Evidence indicates that the world organization still faces many great challenges. Most important, insecurity is growing especially in non-Western, or developing, regions; meanwhile, the United Nations' ability to maintain or restore peace has been reduced. That results from the fact that the United Nations (as shall be seen) possesses only a limited institutional and logistical capacity to undertake major peace operations around the world. By helping to build effective regional organizations and security communities, however, the United Nations has a better chance of achieving its goals.

Conflicts and prospects for regional security

Much of the world remains inflicted by poverty, repressive violence, and war. Prior to the end of the Second World War, most of the non-Western or developing states had suffered at the hands of Western and Japanese colonialism and imperialism. After independence, they bore much of the world's burden, measured by the number of armed conflicts, human- and democratic-rights abuses, poverty levels, and environmental scarcity (defined in terms of environmental degradation, population growth, and unequal distribution of resources) (Homer-Dixon 1998). During the cold war, armed conflicts within and between states broke out in all non-Western regions – Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Between 1945 and 1989, the number of wars worldwide grew to well over a hundred. Of the 38 instances of war listed in Kalevi J. Holsti's extensive work, 56 (the exceptions being the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the Korean War) "took place in areas constituent of the Third World." Strikingly, he points out, "[this] is an incidence of more than one war per year, approximately forty times the incidence of war within the industrial world" (Holsti 1991: 304–305).

The end of the cold war has witnessed growing numbers of conflicts in the various non-Western regions, and most of them have been intrastate. Even during the cold war, every internal war broke out in regions outside Western regions. In the 1945–1989 period, more than 125 wars broke out within non-Western states. Between 1989 and 1992 there were 32 armed conflicts in the world, of which only three were between states (United Nations Development Programme 1994: 47). In 1993–1994, only two additional interstate conflicts broke out, but nine more intrastate conflicts erupted. Thus, during the 1989–1994 period, 96 armed conflicts broke out, of which only 5 were between two states. Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg have therefore declared "the end of international war" (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1995).

Liberal scholars argue that the number of armed conflicts between and within states could be reduced by the spread of democracy around the world. Although this may be true, Western-type democracy continues to face numerous challenges. At a first glance, some progress has been made towards democracy, although it is still limited. The number of democracies around the world has increased dramatically, but it is not particularly meaningful, because the quality, or maturity, of democracy is so important. Here, the empirical findings are not very positive. "Mature democracies" outside the West are still far too few. Fareed Zakaria argues that the number of illiberal democracies (or neo-authoritarian states) has increased. As he puts it: "From Peru to the Palestinian Authority, from Sierra Leone to Slovakia, from Pakistan to the Philippines, we see the rise of a disturbing phenomenon in international life – illiberal democracy" (Zakaria 1997: 22). Democracy, defined as a free and fair electoral process, is "flourishing"; however, constitutional liberalism; the rule of law; the separation of powers; and the protection of the basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property, are not. The future of global governance based on liberal democracy remains precarious.

Nevertheless, there is still hope for long-term stability and peace in non-Western regions, partly because not all of them have experienced the same degree of war and repressive violence. Between 1945 and 1996, Latin America (with 17 wars) was more peaceful than the Middle East (25), which was more stable than Africa (27) and Asia (29) (Harada and Tanako 1999: 333, 345). In recent years, some regions have become more stable. During the cold war, East Asia experienced seven full-scale interstate wars and has not seen one since the 1990s.

Even more encouraging for the future development in these regions is the fact that achieving regional stability and peace is not a total impossibility. Western regions have by far been the most successful in building stable security communities. It is now almost inconceivable today that states in either North America or most of Europe would wage war against each other. These regions had not always been peaceful, of course: prior to the American Civil War, for instance, the United States and Canada remained hostile to each other, often on the brink of war (and crossing it in the war of 1812). Between 1839 and 1842, they almost fought again, over defining the border between Maine and New Brunswick. After the end of the American Civil War, their hostile bilateral relations were transformed into peaceful ones. They have yet to turn themselves into a supranational entity similar to the EU, but they have enjoyed stable, peaceful relations. Western Europe has also become one of the world's most stable regions, although it was not always so. During the fifteenth century, the Spanish crown drove out the Jews. In the sixteenth century, the French did the same to the Huguenots. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the British crown induced Protestant dissenters to migrate to the American colonies. Then came the nineteenth century's "ethnic cleansing," which occurred throughout Eastern Europe when Bulgarians, Greeks, Jews, Turks, Hungarians, Serbs, and Macedonians were put to flight. During the last 500 years of the second millennium, Europe was the world's primary generator of war. One of the bloodiest wars in European history, the "Thirty Years War," occurred there in the first half of the seventeenth century (Holsti 1991: 28–29). As recently as the first half of the twentieth century, two bloody world wars broke out in Europe and claimed some 50 million lives. Europe again became the main focus of world attention during the cold war between the United

States and the Soviet Union. However, the prospects for war among Western European states never re-emerged: Europe enjoyed what came to be known as the "long peace" (Gaddis 1987).

The end of the cold war in the early 1990s has, to date, largely refuted the neo-realist argument that "we will soon miss the cold war" (because Europe would no longer stay peaceful in the absence of a common threat from the Soviet Union) (Mearsheimer 1990). Even some realist-inclined scholars have now found a new faith in the fact that war among Western states is very unlikely. Samuel Huntington asserts that "[military] conflict among Western states is unthinkable" (Huntington 1993: 39). Robert Jervis, another realist, also sees in Western Europe "the triumph of interests over passions" and views Western Europeans as less inclined to believe that "war is ... good, or even ... honorable" (Jervis 1991/1992: 2).

The limits of United Nations peace operations

If the United Nations is to help promote peace and stable global governance systems, it must be able to take action to promote peaceful change toward liberal democracy by engaging in preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping, peace enforcement, and peace building in wartorn and authoritarian states. Preventive diplomacy is the attempt to resolve disputes before they escalate into violent clashes. Peacemaking refers to all forms of diplomatic action intended to manage or resolve conflict prior to or after the outbreak of hostilities. Peace-keeping is an operation involving UN military personnel from member states separating adversaries with the hope of restoring peace on the basis of three principles – consent, impartiality, and the limited use of force for self-defence. Peace enforcement involves military action or intervention of UN-mandated armed forces of member states when peacemaking or peace-keeping efforts have failed. Peace building is a post-conflict international effort with a goal broader than peace-keeping in that the international community works to promote national governance in the following areas: creating or strengthening national institutions, monitoring elections, promoting human rights, providing for reintegration and rehabilitation programmes, and creating conditions for resumed development.[1]

The entire UN system has undoubtedly contributed to the process of peace building in the developing world. The UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), for instance, has done much to meet the rising demands of developing countries in the various regions of the world. Regional economic (or economic and social) commissions have been set up for Europe, Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean,

Western Asia, and Africa. The Economic Commission for Europe helped to rebuild Western Europe from the devastation of the Second World War. The Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (later renamed the Economic Commission for Asia and the Pacific) has done much to promote economic development and regional free trade. The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean is known for its contribution to the establishment of the Inter-American Development Bank, the Latin American Free Trade Association, the Central American Common Market, and other cooperative projects.

Nevertheless, it would be fair to say that these regional commissions have had a limited impact on regional peace and stability. Their operational effectiveness often depends on the socio-economic and political conditions of each region. The Economic Commission for Africa and the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia have not done as well as the commissions in the other regions. In Africa, the commission's operations have encountered numerous obstacles (thus limiting its effectiveness), including "the abject poverty of many of its peoples and political rivalries among its members, many of which have ineffective and authoritarian governments" (Ziring, Riggs, and Plano 2000: 452). More can be said about the commission in Western Asia, where the war between Israel and Lebanon and the latter's internal strife forced the commission to move its headquarters from Lebanon to Baghdad. Its headquarters remained in Baghdad, but "the development activities of the commission have yet to materialize." Moreover, the unsuccessful attempt to establish a Middle East Commission resulted from "the lack of regional harmony" (Ziring, Riggs, and Plano 2000: 452).

Unfortunately, the growing insecurity of non-Western regions coincides with the weakening ability of the United Nations to maintain or restore regional stability and peace. One indicator of the growing weakness of the United Nations is the declining number of its international peace-keeping operations since the mid-1990s. Previously, there was an extraordinary growth in peace-keeping operations in the early 1990s: whereas the United Nations undertook only 15 peace-keeping operations between 1945 and 1989, the Security Council authorized 18 such peace-keeping operations between 1989 and 1994, which peaked in 1993 (with a total deployment of some 80,000 Blue Helmets, compared with fewer than 10,000 in 1987). During the second half of the 1990s, however, the United Nations started to wane in global influence: in 1998, only 14,000 peace-keepers were deployed, although the number went up again to 27,000 in 2000.

The small number of UN personnel and peace-keepers has failed to meet the need to promote global governance. The decline of UN peace activities seems correlated to the fact that the United Nations no longer

ɔssesses the institutional and logistic capacity necessary to undertake ajor peace operations. In the mid-1990s, the United Nations had an /erall Secretariat staff of around 12,000 (including those in the Secreriat in New York City and those based in Geneva, Nairobi, and ienna). In 1997, the United Nations was expected to cut its staff to)00 employees, who would serve a world population of six billion. Even e UN peace-keeping staff at UN headquarters in New York remains ıy, with 32 military officers overseeing 27,000 troops deployed in 14 ace missions around the world and with only nine police specialists survising 8,600 police officers. The (UN-commissioned) Brahimi Report ıkes a critical assessment of UN peace operations with searing honesty: acknowledges that "the United Nations has [over the last decade] ɔeatedly failed to [save succeeding generations from the scourge of ır]." It adds that "it can do no better today."[2] UN Secretary-General ɔfi Annan has now admitted that the world organization has a "crediity crisis": "Too many vulnerable communities in too many regions the world now hesitate to look to the United Nations to assist them their hour of need" (*International Herald Tribune*, 9–10 September)0: 1).

Increasing financial shortages have limited the capacity of the United .tions to undertake peace operations. Top UN bureaucrats have long ılized that the future of their organization is at stake. Former UN Unrsecretary-General for Peace-keeping Marrack Goulding, for instance, ;ues that the United Nations "is now facing a danger analogous to that ed by the League of Nations at its very inception." He spoke of the ıss of the confidence and support of the richest and most powerful ıntry in the world [the US]" (Goulding 1999: 62).[3] Goulding considers k of money to be "the greatest threat to the United Nations' capacity ɔerform" (Goulding 1999: 62). At the peak of UN peace-keeping, und dues for the regular budget and peace-keeping operations amounted $2 billion; the United Nations' cash reserves ($380 million) were not ch higher than its monthly expenditures ($310 million). The United :ions' annual regular budget from 1994 to 1997 was only $1.3 billion, y 3.4 per cent of New York City's budget ($38 billion) for the 1998 al year (Mendez 1997: 284). It should also be worth noting that the regular budget further decreased from a mere $1.3 billion (1997) to .9 billion (1998), nearly $1 billion less than the annual cost of Tokyo's : Department.

'his does not mean that the United Nations has given up on its efforts :nhance world peace. Faced with growing challenges, the United Nas has, in recent years, sought to do more with less. The United Nas became more willing to entrust matters of international peace and ırity to regional organizations, simply because it no longer appeared

up to the task of doing it on its own. Former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali recommended that regional organizations assume a more active role in conflict management, and current UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has encouraged them to do so, provided that they receive a mandate from the Security Council. He sought to intensify cooperation between the global and regional organizations, particularly in the area of conflict prevention, stressing the virtue of comparative advantage and cooperation based on the principles of complementarity and "subsidiarity" (or what is generally known as "subcontracting") (Griffin 1999a). Complementarity means that various actors do not work at cross purposes, but support each other in peace missions; subsidiarity allows policy-making to take place at the lowest appropriate level (Griffin 1999b). Andy Knight further describes the subsidiarity model as a sharing of tasks between the United Nations and regional institutions, whereby the former should perform a task necessary for the smooth running of governance if the latter should shy away from it (Knight 1996). This form of regionalism must be seen in the larger context of universalism in that the UN Security Council remains the pillar of international peace and security.

However, arguments against the regionalization of peacemaking, peace-keeping, and peace building are numerous. First, the growth of regional organizations raises the question of "democratic deficit," as national leaders make decisions without consulting their citizens. Second, critics see the process of entrusting matters of international peace and security to regional organizations as ignoring the fact that their knowledge of regional problems may not be readily translated into effective action. During the cold war, regional organizations fared no better than the United Nations (Holsti 1989: 117). Moreover, their motives for intervention may not be altruistic: they may have agendas based on their interests and therefore fail to act with impartiality, a condition necessary for effective peace-keeping (Smith and Weiss 1998: 228). Third, the Security Council's motives behind such burden-sharing arrangements are also questionable. Some critics feel that the "Council's growing penchant for formally subcontracting or informally delegating the promotion of international peace and security is not always appropriate or well-intentioned" (Berman 1998: 2) and that the United States' desire to save money and the lives of its own citizens "primarily accounts for the trend" (Berman 1998: 3). The subsidiarity model may also promote regional leadership in that dominant states in the different regions of the world will seek to intervene in the affairs of other states. This may encourage more of the external interventions that occurred during the cold-war period, which often exacerbated and internationalized domestic conflicts. Fourth, the United Nations has not defined a specific division of labour

etween the two types of institutions. This is partly attributed to the UN 'harter, which does not prescribe what the two types of organizations ıould do and how they should cooperate (Griffin 1999b: 21). Fifth, the sion also ignores the fact that regional institutions are generally less ıpable than the United Nations.

Although these criticisms present real challenges to the "regionaliza-on" efforts of the United Nations, they should not overshadow the fact ıat regional security communities still have a lot of potential to lay the oundwork for promoting global governance.

'lobal governance and security communities: Some criteria

or analytical purposes, it is worth defining global governance. Accord-g to the Commission on Global Governance, "governance is not syn-ıymous with government." Global governance is neither world govern-ent nor global federalism. The idea of world government runs contrary that of global governance in the sense that the former would render e world "less democratic, more accommodating to power, more hospi-ble to hegemonic ambition, and more enforcing the roles of states and overnments rather than the rights of people" (Commission on Global overnance 1995: xvi). According to James Rosenau, "while [both] refer purposive behavior, to goal-oriented activities, to systems of rule ... overnment suggests activities that are backed by formal authority, by olice powers to insure the implementation of duly constituted princi-es." But "governance refers to activities by shared goals that may or ay not derive from legal and formally prescribed responsibilities and at do not necessarily rely on police powers to overcome defiance and tain compliance." It "is a system of rule that works only if it is accepted the majority" (Rosenau 1992: 4). Although governance is linked to der, it is defined in terms of legitimacy rather than coercive power and more people-oriented. In the context of global governance, there is a arked conceptual shift from the concept of state sovereignty to that of opular sovereignty in that the new world order would better reflect the N Charter's aspiration: "We the Peoples of the United Nations."

Security-community building is a project that can help the United Na-ıns in promoting global governance. Security communities should be eated as part of global governance, which stands between a utopian orld (one without strife) and the Hobbesian world (in which a constant ssibility of interstate war exists). Michael Barnett and Emanuel Adler pture this point well in their assertion that "[security] communities ... not portray an ideal world of international security." Rather, they d, such regional communities "show that international security changes

with time, and such changes are a result of mixtures of anarchy and hierarchy, coercion and communication" (Barnett and Adler 1998: 438).

Security communities are generally defined as ones whose members develop dependable expectations for peaceful change. Evidence suggests the existence of such communities when their members "renounce military violence" and have "deeply entrenched habits of the peaceful resolution of conflicts." Their governance structure, aimed at overcoming defection and attaining compliance, thus relies less on police powers and more on shared goals and inter-subjective meanings (Adler and Barnett 1998: 35). This does not mean that coercive power will soon become irrelevant or unnecessary; even in stable liberal democracies, this form of power remains as important as ever. As is discussed later, liberal-democratic political leadership serves as a key basis for successful security-community building.

In this chapter, "success" in regional community building is defined on two different levels. On one level, a group of states within a particular region can claim success in such endeavours only when they no longer expect to go to war against each other. Thus, the peaceful process of regional cooperation or integration is considered "success." On the second level, success can also be defined in terms of a regional organization's ability to restore peace and promote dependable expectations for peaceful change with or among non-member states outside its own region.

The question is how non-Western regions can build stable security communities, such as those in the Western regions. This study rejects cultural determinism, goes beyond the sociological perspective that gives attention only to socialization among all types of élite groups but disregards the role of ideology,[4] and develops a type of constructivism that takes into account some liberal and realist insights.

Criterion 1: Experience in conflict management

Experience in conflict management/resolution is essential to success in community building. The more experienced the member states of a regional organization are in managing/resolving conflict, the more likely it is that they will succeed in community building.

Criterion 2: Membership size

Members of an organization seeking to build a community must be small in size. As Kenneth Waltz puts it, "for the sake of stability ... smaller is better ... [and] two is best of all" (Waltz 1979: 161). The seminal work by Mancur Olson on the logic of collective action helps to explain the collective goods problem (Olson 1965). A regional organization with a large number of members is less likely to surmount coordination problems. Member states tend to adopt decision-making procedures based on

principle of consensus, which makes it hard for them to arrive at de-
ons effectively.

terion 3: Democratic performance

nmunity building is easier if member states of a regional organization
e become liberal democracies or, at least, have a very high degree of
pect for human rights (Doyle 1986, 1996; Maoz and Russett 1993).
nocracies are less likely to revert to authoritarianism largely if they
generally wealthy and their populations enjoy equitable distributions
wealth and incomes. According to Adam Przeworski and others, de-
cracy in a country with an annual income per capita of less than
000 lasts on average only about 8.5 years; it lasts 16 years in one with
ome between $1,000 and $2,000, 33 years between $2,000 and $4,000,
l 100 years where the income is between $4,000 and $6,000 (Przewor-
Alvarez, and Cheibub 1996).

terion 4: Political leadership

imately, regional security communities must have a regional political
ndation. That is, the member states must have among themselves a
nocratic leader,[5] who also possesses adequate material capabilities
ilitary and economic) for effective democratic intervention. This does
mean that, when a regional democratic leader exists, there will be a
ble security community. Unless that leader is committed to democratic
ervention, a security community will not emerge or grow stable (or
ture) (Meernik 1996).[6] Democratic leadership helps to build security
nmunities.

is study's hypothesis is that the larger the number of the above criteria
group of states is able to fulfil, the more successful its community-
lding efforts are likely to be.

orth America and Western Europe: Meeting most criteria
r security-community building

e extent to which international organizations in different regions have
ceeded in promoting national and regional governance is not easy to
termine. It appears, however, that there is clear variation in regional
bility and peace. Grouped together for comparative analysis, the
rth American region, the EU, NATO, and the OSCE show varying
grees of success, with the last one being the least successful regional
ganization. The varying successes enjoyed by the EU, NATO, and the

OSCE during and after the cold war can be assessed at two levels: these are (1) dependable expectations of peaceful change among the member states and (2) their efforts to promote such expectations outside their organizational boundaries. The latter is put to the test in the handling of the armed conflicts in the Balkans. As is shown later, the OSCE has proved less successful than the EU and NATO on level one (among their own members).

The North American community

North America has been known as one of the most stable security communities in the world. Initially made up of Canada and the United States, the community has now expanded to include Mexico. Canada and the United States have a growing number of transactions and a high degree of interdependence, but have not established formal organizations for political cooperation. In 1988 they also created a two-nation free trade area. They also have a long tradition of military cooperation. As Kalevi J. Holsti puts it, "there is little question that Canada and the United States constitute a pluralistic security community." The two neighbouring states have experienced problems that impinge upon their national interests; however, "there is little likelihood of conflict leading to violence." Government officials and bureaucrats from both sides "seldom go beyond the use of warnings, protests, and occasional nonviolent threats" (Holsti 1988: 439). Sean Shore also argues that the two states "constitute a striking example of a pluralistic security community," based on the assurance that they would settle their disputes through peaceful means (Shore 1998: 333).

In recent years, Mexico has also developed positive relations with both Canada and the United States. Together, the three states created a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which entered into force in 1994. None of them is prepared for war against the others. This is not to suggest that they no longer have disputes among themselves; NAFTA has been a principal source of tension among them. New problems, such as opposition to American and Canadian losses of jobs to Mexico and the tide of illegal migrants, have in fact created anti-free trade sentiment in both Canada and the United States. However, there is no evidence that they are militarily hostile to each other.

The European Union

Ole Wæver characterizes Western Europe as a "classic" security community. Although the EU itself is not usually viewed as a security orga-

nization, "integration itself has far greater security importance" (Wæver 1998: 100). The process of regional integration through membership enlargement and deeper relations among EU members still continues.

At their summit in December 1999, the 15 EU leaders agreed to throw the regional door open to new applicants from outside Western Europe. Negotiations with six states – Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia, and Cyprus – continue. Six other states – Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Malta – have been accepted as formal candidates. Turkey was promised acceptance as a future candidate, although with conditions and without any clear time-frame. Greece and Turkey – two rivals which have devoted financial and organizational resources to the possibility of war with each other – have now agreed to accept each other.

The EU continues to mature as a security community. With the single market in 1992 completing the Common Market programme launched with the Treaty of Rome in 1957, a single currency, and a single central bank, the EU has now entered a much deeper phase of regional integration. At their summit late in 1999, the 15 EU leaders made their joint decision, which ushered in a new Europe. A foundation for their common defence strategy was laid when they agreed to establish the capacity to field joint military forces up to 60,000 and political and military structures to direct them. Although the force will not function before 2003, "it is already being hailed by some Europeans as the vanguard of an entirely unified military, in the same way the EU member states have uniform policies in fields ranging from farm subsidies to rail transport" (*Japan Times*, 9 December 1999: 21).

The EU, however, has not yet become much more successful in restoring peace with or among non-members – for example, such as putting an end to ethnic conflict in the Balkans. A European Commission staff member acknowledges a "glaring discrepancy between the economic and political influence of the EU," especially *vis-à-vis* its ineffectiveness associated with the Yugoslavian disintegration (Rhodes 1998: 19). This does not mean that the EU has not been useful as an instrument for peace building. The EU Stability Pact for south-eastern Europe has been aimed at luring fragile states in the Balkans in the way that the EU has lured central European states. After the NATO attacks on Yugoslavia in 1999, the EU has also been active in providing financial support for the peace-building process.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NATO has been transformed in the last ten years into a better security community involved in peace-keeping, promoting ethnic coexistence, and

providing a secure environment for democratic elections. Within the context of NATO, the member states from North America to Western Europe have become known as a "transatlantic security community," in which "[no] country ... expects to go to war with any other" (Ruggie 1998: 229).

NATO came in when the EU and the OSCE failed to put out the ethnic flames in the Balkans. This is not to say that NATO enjoyed complete success, but it has done much better than hard-nosed political realists had foreseen. Since 1991, it has undertaken a new task – out-of-area peace operations. In 1992, NATO agreed to consider enforcing the UN Security Council's decisions and those of the OSCE on a case-by-case basis. NATO began monitoring the UN embargo against the warring parties in the Balkan war in July 1992. The following year saw NATO enforcing a no-fly zone in Bosnia. In 1994, NATO pledged to defend Sarajevo with air strikes. That same year, when NATO used force for the first time in Bosnia, it was in support of the UN mission there. In February, NATO fired its first shots "in anger." This came after NATO had warned warring parties to remove heavy weapons from an exclusion zone around Sarajevo. NATO's first-ever combat began in August 1995, when the United States and Britain launched joint air strikes against the Serbs in the Bosnian battlefield (Leurdijk 1996).

NATO's much-publicized air strikes on Serbia (beginning on 24 March 1999 and lasting 11 weeks until 4 June) testified to the fact that the organization was more willing and more able to intervene in ethnic conflict outside its original mandate. In the end, NATO prevailed. The government in Belgrade allowed NATO and the UN to keep the peace in Kosovo and agreed to let the Albanian refugees return to their homes. Whether the unprecedented NATO combat mission is "a perfect failure" or a "success" is a matter of debate for the months and years to come (Mandelbaum 1999; Steinberg 1999). At best, the NATO mission has produced an incomplete peace; it is hoped that the successes will outweigh the failures.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

Although former American diplomat James Goodby predicted that the OSCE would outstrip old and tired security bodies such as NATO and the Western European Union (WEU, by now a military wing of the EU, originally created in 1948 for collective self-defence; Goodby 1993), NATO still plays the dominant role in the security field. There are limits to what the OSCE can accomplish (Lucas 1996). It is the least effective, when compared with the EU and NATO, in terms of transforming itself into a true security community in which all of its members have devel-

oped dependable expectations of peaceful change, but it has made a useful contribution to security. It has in recent years been active in a "soft-security" role in the Balkans, in the CIS, and in the Baltic States, with several peace missions trying to resolve conflicts. Its performance in fields of its specific competence – such as early warning, early action, and early prevention – has been characterized as positive. Its successes include the role it has played in the implementation of the Dayton peace agreement in Bosnia–Herzegovina, its numerous attempts at getting Albania's warring parties to settle their differences peacefully, and its investigations of the conditions of Russian minorities in such states as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

What the OSCE has achieved can be judged as less than a moderate success, but not a complete failure. Although the OSCE mandate includes conflict prevention and resolution, it has not performed this role to the satisfaction of its proponents. Accordingly, Emanuel Adler considers the OSCE to be a "security community-building institution" only. He does not feel that "the entire OSCE will ultimately succeed in establishing a pluralistic security community in the OSCE region" (Adler 1998: 122). In his view, "[while] OSCE conflict-prevention and crisis-management practices have made some difference in a few areas ... the OSCE was almost powerless to stop conflicts after they erupted" (Adler 1998: 130).

Explanation of the varying degrees of success of regional organizations[7]

Criterion 1: Experience in security management

Within the North American community, Canada and the United States have accumulated much experience in conflict management. The two states did have several military crises, which spurred them to prepare for war. By the mid-1870s the United States had stopped spending on fortifications along the Canadian border. Canada took similar steps. According to Sean M. Shore, "[between] 1871 and 1876 ... Canada ... cut defense spending by two-thirds, and allowed its fortifications to lapse" (Shore 1998: 343). The two neighbours have since not taken steps to promote regional integration as members of the EU have done, but much of their collaboration and coordination occur at different government levels. According to K. J. Holsti, Canadian and American bureaucrats "at all levels and from all departments communicate and meet to negotiate proposals, elicit responses, hammer out details, and draft treaties or establish the frameworks that will guide national policies or coordinated ventures." Moreover, "the vast majority of problems that impinge upon interests of both states are handled in this manner" (Holsti 1988: 439).

The varying degrees of success experienced by the EU, NATO, and the OSCE can also be explained in terms of their different abilities in meeting criterion 1. Among the three regional organizations, the EU is (although it was founded after NATO) no doubt the most experienced in conflict management among its members. Before the integration process began after the Second World War, European states had experienced centuries of war. In that time, European states had accumulated experience of conflict management and institution building (the Concert of Europe during the first half of the nineteenth century being a good example). These "lessons learned" have proved helpful for building new and more effective institutions after the Second World War.

In comparison to the EU, NATO as a transatlantic organization is less experienced in conflict management because it has been a collective defence alliance directed at a third party whose containment during the cold war was pursued by military means. Formed after the Second World War with the aim of deterring Soviet incursion in Europe, NATO has grown into the world's mightiest military alliance. Within 50 years its membership has demonstrated its effectiveness. No other military alliance in the world can compare with it. NATO members have been involved in numerous meetings for consultation. However, the organization has also experienced problems of its own, including France's withdrawal from military integration in NATO in 1966–1967 and serious conflict among some of its members, such as that of Greece and Turkey over Cyprus. According to John Ruggie, "the EU is better equipped than NATO to deal with many of the non-military tasks the United States, in particular, has sought to place on NATO's shoulders *vis-à-vis* Central and Eastern Europe" (Ruggie 1998: 232).

In contrast to EU and NATO, the OSCE as an organization has accumulated a more limited experience in conflict management/resolution although most of its members have gained considerable experience in arms control and confidence building. OSCE emerged as a process only in 1975, known as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). At the time when Yugoslavia collapsed, the organization did not even have any collective tools which could be used "to diffuse substate conflict through mediation or through promoting confidence-building exercises among conflicting groups." It was not until 1992 that the member states created several new security mechanisms, including a High Commissioner on National Minorities and "missions of long duration" (Flynn and Farrell 1999: 506).

Criterion 2: Membership size

If a smaller number of states within a particular region indeed creates a better quality of regional security, then North America fits that criterion. The community initially consisted of only two states (Canada and the

Jnited States) and now has only three members, including Mexico. If the :U is more successful than NATO and OSCE in terms of integration mong its members, it may be partly because of its smaller size so far. 'he EU membership was initially small (starting with only six members, 'hen France and Germany gave birth to the European Coal and Steel 'ommunity, together with Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemurg). Nowadays, the EU has 15 member states and thus remains smaller ıan NATO (19 members) and the OSCE (55 members). The EU reıains divided mainly between the original six who want closer political ıtegration and a minority (led by Britain) who have long wanted nothg more than a free trade arrangement. According to Roy Denman, a ırmer representative of the European Commission in Washington, "the ıp between the two camps shows no sign of closing. Opposition in Britn to any closer involvement with Europe is rising steadily" (*Internaonal Herald Tribune*, 26 April 2000: 8). No wonder the recent EU decion to consider 12 new applicants for admission into its fold has raised ıncerns about its future. At the Helsinki summit in June 1999, Luxemırg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker was among the sceptics who ked how far Europe could go. Recently, both Valéry Giscard d'Estaing ormer President of France) and Helmut Schmidt (former Chancellor of est Germany) also warned that "[already] with 15 member states, EU stitutions are not functioning well." They added their concern, saying haste] to enlarge the Union can lead to a sequence of severe crises in e first decade of the new century" (*International Herald Tribune*, 11 oril 2000: 8).

By comparison, NATO and the OSCE have more members than the J. The rather large number of members has posed a challenge to coltive action. The fact that each member can veto a proposed military ion is one explanation for the hesitant NATO intervention in Kosovo. e member states disagreed, for instance, on whether to launch a land ack on Serbia. Thus, deciding on the intervention in Kosovo, accord- to US Admiral Leighton W. Smith, who commanded NATO forces Bosnia in 1996, "... was Viet Nam 19 times. This lowest commonıominator approach is no way to fight a war." Washington had to ft "from trying to defeat Mr Milosevic to preserving the cohesion of TO" (*International Herald Tribune*, 21 April 2000: 6).

f OSCE has been generally less successful than the EU and NATO erms of achieving cooperation among member states and of coordiing their common activities, it is partly because the OSCE has fallen rt of meeting criterion 2. Its membership size has always been much ger than that of the other two organizations. The number of the found- members was 35, comprising Canada, the United States, and every opean state (including the Soviet Union) except Albania. Follow- the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, however, the mem-

bership quickly jumped to 55. With such a large membership and operating on the basis of consensus-minus-one, the OSCE has often been indecisive with regard to taking security-related action because of the threat of veto. According to Gregory Flynn and Henry Farrell, "there is ample evidence that states small and large were not shy about using this power" (Flynn and Farrell 1999: 513). Although the group adopted the consensus-minus-one rule in January 1992 (allowing the Council of Ministers to take action against any participating state deemed guilty of gross human rights violations), it is far from clear that this rule has worked well. For example, the organization used the rule to suspend Yugoslavia in the Spring of 1992, but "in the face of the violence that accompanied the collapse of Yugoslavia, the CSCE was powerless" (Flynn and Farrell 1999: 520).

In general, members of the three Western institutions have also proved to be more capable of working together to achieve certain common purposes and coordination. Interventions in Bosnia–Herzegovina and Kosovo, for instance, were not the work of NATO alone: the OSCE and the EU collaborated with NATO, which has promoted the concept of "interlocking institutions." In Barry Hughes' words, "[no] single organization is likely to organize the future security environment of Europe" (Hughes 1995: 237).

Criterion 3: Democratic values and performance

More importantly, almost all members of Western security communities have met this criterion. Most are mature liberal democracies with developed economies. Although peaceful relations between the United States and Canada need to be explained in terms of small size (two neighbours), the two states are among the world's most mature democracies. Sean Shore adopted a constructivist approach to help shed light on this security community (Shore 1998). One of the critical points he makes is that this community emerged during the 1870s, after the American Civil War. Although the "German question" and the Soviet threat induced states in Western Europe to cooperate, the reason for cooperation between the United States and Canada was not because they faced any such common threat; in fact, it was not until after the First World War broke out that the two neighbours shared a perception of a common threat. Although the stable peace in North America could not be replicated somewhere else, as Shore argues, it is more appropriate to explain this security community by considering the fact that Canada came to be perceived by the Americans as a liberal democracy. Prior to that period they considered Canada's parliamentary system to be antidemocratic and tyrannical.

After Mexico had adopted a policy of economic liberalization and become more democratic, its leaders took steps to promote better relations

with Canada and the United States. It was President Carlos Salina of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI, which has dominated the country since the late 1920s), who won the approval of NAFTA. During the second half of the 1990s, the PRI began to lose its grip on power. The elections of July 2000 finally put an end to 71 years of one-party rule and allowed a peaceful democratic transition of power. The newly elected leadership is committed to fighting against corruption, working for accountability of public officials, promoting the rule of law and security for all citizens, and accelerating economic growth. Current President Vicente Fox also pledged to engage his country's partners in NAFTA (*International Herald Tribune*, 26–27 August 2000: 6).

Western European states have also become mature democracies after centuries of violent state building. All EU members are democratic states and have sought to promote human rights. The EU carries on this tradition. Clearly, in seeking to enlarge their union, the existing members have undertaken a democratic project. Such applicants as Turkey (which fails to meet the EU's democratic and human-rights standards) have failed to gain full admission to the union. Stephen Van Evera argues that "key pre-conditions for democracy ... are now far more widespread in Europe than they were eighty years ago" (Van Evera 1990/1991: 26). These European democracies are also stable or mature, partly because they are wealthier than their predecessors. Their populations have benefited from more equitable distributions of wealth and incomes, thus making them less subject to the evils of militarism and hyper-nationalism.

The fact that the OSCE has been less successful than the EU and NATO in terms of cooperation among member states and humanitarian intervention also can be explained by the fact that its members do not fully share and practise liberal democracy. Although OSCE members were committed to working with the United Nations and pledged to promote human rights, several of them remain unstable democracies. Russia and other Eastern European members are fragile or illiberal democracies still with the potential to revert to authoritarianism. According to the 1995 US President's Report on OSCE activities, 15 of the 23 former Communist OSCE members received good marks on democracy, 14 in the rule of law, and 13 in human rights. The report also states, however, that "there is ample proof of the continuing existence of old, undemocratic attitudes and habits which reflect the great difficulty in changing deeply rooted totalitarian behavior and show that many countries have a long way to go" (Adler 1998: 131).

Criterion 4: Political leadership

Most importantly, the role of political leadership has been essential to the building and maintaining of Western security communities. Shared democratic values between Canada and the United States did not play the most decisive role in shaping the North American security community. Sean Shore fails to explain that Canada was the weaker state which could not expect to fight a successful war with the United States. Prior to confederation in 1867, "Canada was not even a unified state" (Shore 1998: 335). It also "disarmed after 1867" (Shore 1998: 333). More noteworthy is the fact that the development of this community came at a time when Britain had already decided to "quit the day-to-day defense of the continent in 1871, and left the task to the new [Canadian] government" (Shore 1998: 342). As the lesser power, Canada clearly posed little military threat to the United States and definitely could not entertain any idea of resisting the United States or of maintaining hostile relations with the latter. Being a NATO member, Canada has also been locked into this US-led military alliance. The "democratic peace" between the two nations must thus take the reality of US preponderance of power into account. Also noteworthy is the argument put forward by Sean Shore, who believes that "American preponderance ... facilitated a certain kind of trust, one that would have been more difficult to come by had Canada been more powerful" (Shore 1998: 344).

American leadership has also played an extremely important role in the development of democratic security communities in the West. The post-Second World War democratic-order project by the United States, for instance, resulted in the establishment of international institutions among Western democracies and Japan. The United States succeeded not only in turning Germany and Japan into liberal democracies but also in reintegrating them into the community of strong industrial economies (Nakamura 1998).

Why other Western democracies joined the United States is a matter of debate. However, as Michael Doyle acknowledges, American military leadership has helped to dampen the prospects of Western Europe and Japan re-emerging as independent military powers. In his view, the liberal peace could have been imperilled if Western Europe and Japan had established substantial forces independent of the United States (Doyle 1996: 28).

Within Western Europe itself, France and Germany have provided firm leadership in the process of regional integration. Robert Gilpin makes a very persuasive argument that the EU rests on a political foundation. European treaties, such as the Treaty of Paris and the Treaty of Rome, contain political objectives; thus, the desire to rid Europe of the French–German rivalry became the driving force for regional integration. The drive for European unification also arose from European leaders' realization that their continent was losing influence in world affairs. Gilpin views the "French–German alliance" as central to the ambition to create Euro-

land (Gilpin 2000). If the EU were to succeed in building a European army, it would be mainly because France and Germany took the lead. It was they who also set up Eurocorps in the 1990s.

However, the EU's unsuccessful intervention efforts in the former Yugoslavia can be explained by the fact that, before Kosovo, it was still unable to forge an effective common defence and foreign policy. The WEU, the military defence mechanism in the region, still lacks the institutional and logistical capacity to undertake peace-enforcement operations, as some EU member states (such as the United Kingdom) had remained committed to NATO. One analyst describes the WEU as "an organization in limbo and on hold" (Vierucci 1995: 308). Although the Kosovo crisis has led the EU to develop a new vision for the region by taking new steps to strengthen what is now called the "European Security and Defense Identity," the EU still remains an economically driven supranational organization. NATO's military power, however, compensated for the EU inability to terminate ethnic conflicts in the Balkans.

Recent NATO successes in humanitarian intervention, however modest, had much to do with the fact that the member states were led by powerful, mature democracies, such as the United States, Britain, and France. NATO was fortunate to have them lead the air campaign against Serbia. The United States provided 70 per cent of NATO's military capacity. Although its members had not always been willing to follow its lead, they resisted the Americans only so far, and did not risk the cohesion of the organization.

The OSCE, however, not only lacks resources but also faces the absence of a powerful democratic leader. President George Bush and Secretary of State James Baker referred to the CSCE as part of their vision for a "Europe whole and free." Its successes resulted from its members' shared values and norms as well as from the constructive role played by the great powers, most of whom are liberal democracies (Baker 1993). However, within the OSCE, neither the United States nor Russia is the dominant leader: besides not being a liberal democratic leader, Russia has been on the decline as a great power; neither can the United States be considered a power commanding obedience from the large number of states belonging to the OSCE.

Non-Western regions: Meeting few criteria for community building

On the basis of the four criteria of success in regional security community building, this chapter shows that regional organizations in the non-Western world have proved themselves far less effective than their

Western counterparts. A look at each of the well-known regional organizations bears this out. They include the OAS, the ASEAN, the GCC, the CIS, the OAU, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS). This section compares the varying degrees of operational effectiveness in these regional organizations and assesses the performance of each in its security-community building efforts.

A survey of non-Western regional security communities

Whether Latin America has already created a security community is unclear. In the last decade, however, positive changes have taken place – from rivalry to institutionalized security and economic cooperation, especially in the form of Mercosur (the Southern Common Market) established in 1991 and with a common external tariff in 1995. According to Andrew Hurrell, even the enduring rivalry between two regional powers – Brazil and Argentina – was replaced by *rapprochement* at the end of the 1980s. This dramatic shift involved confidence-building measures and arms-control agreements. Shifts in military posture toward defensive orientation and a decline in military spending have also contributed to an avoidance of the balance-of-power rhetoric evident in the 1960s and 1970s (Hurrell 1998: 231).

This appears to coincide with the fact that the OAS has, over time, become more effective in its efforts to promote peace, to stabilize the region, and to strengthen human rights and democratic institutions. During the 1980s, the OAS could do little to help such war-torn countries as Nicaragua (where the organization was "conspicuous in its absence") and El Salvador (MacFarlane and Weiss 1994: 288). In 1989, its mediation efforts in Panama ended in failure and finally led to US intervention. The OAS intervention in Peru in 1992 was seen as endorsing undemocratic practices (Baranyi 1995). Nevertheless, some, such as Joauín Tacsan, talk of "a renewed optimism toward the OAS" during the 1990s (Tacsan 1998: 91). In 1993, it helped to end the crisis in Guatemala. It also enjoyed a somewhat positive experience in Haiti, where it played a leading role in the deployment of a mission to the country to promote democracy and human rights. By and large, the OAS's performance in peace-building activity is less than impressive.

Admiral Dennis Blair, commander of the US forces in the Pacific, recently argued that "security communities are the way ahead for Asia" (*International Herald Tribune*, 21 April 2000: 6). However, more must be done to achieve this goal. The few existing regional organizations in Asia have been less effective than their counterparts in the West or even Latin and Central America. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC),

ASEAN, and the ASEAN Regional Forum have come under criticism for failing to resolve the Asian economic crisis. Michael Finnegan has even acknowledged that "constructivist predictions of a security community for Northeast Asia are obviously some way from coming to pass" (Finnegan 1998: 7). Asia's best-known regional grouping, ASEAN, remains underinstitutionalized: it has a secretariat, formal and informal summits of heads of states, annual meetings of foreign ministers, and so on. However, it does not have such common institutions as an ASEAN Council, a Council of Ministers, an ASEAN Commission, an ASEAN Parliament, or an ASEAN Court of Justice. Since the end of the cold war, bilateral tensions have even been on the rise among ASEAN members (Ganesan 1999). Although ASEAN has a foundation for a security community, it has yet to develop further. Although the likelihood of interstate military confrontation has lessened, ASEAN has not reached the level of integration where its members agree on a common definition of external threat, a common defence and foreign policy with unfortified borders (Acharya 1998). Neither has ASEAN been largely responsible for promoting peace in member states such as Indonesia (the East Timor crisis) and in non-member states such as Cambodia.

A security community has yet to emerge in the Arab world. The GCC (with six members – Oman, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia) came into existence in 1981 when leaders signed the GCC Charter. The members have failed to transform themselves into a community with dependable expectations for peaceful change. Michael Barnett and F. Gregory Gause III argue that the GCC is a poor candidate for a security community in the foreseeable future because its member states still imagine the possibility of using force to settle their differences. After Iraq's invasion of one of its members (Kuwait) in August 1990, the GCC stood behind Kuwait from the outset. The member states cooperated under a single command, but they maintained their national organization and officers; the Gulf War did not lead to a stronger sense of regionalism among them. As Barnett and Gause point out, "perhaps the single result of the Gulf War was not the promotion of regionalism but rather the retreat to [unbridled] statism" (Barnett and Gause III 1998: 181). Qatar and Bahrain still pose a threat to each other in territorial disputes. As recently as 1992, Saudi Arabia and Qatar clashed over their border.

In the former Soviet Union, the CIS's security-related performance has also been less impressive than that of the OAS or ASEAN. Granted observer status at the United Nations as a regional organization as defined in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the CIS has undertaken peacekeeping operations in several of the new states torn by ethnic conflict. According to Ambassador Vladimir Zemskii (Secretary-General of the

Collective Security Council in the CIS), "[old] seats of conflicts remain and new ones are emerging on the perimeter of the member states borders on the regional level." Furthermore, the use of force based on ideological and military confrontation has been renounced, but military-bloc relapses have not been barred or averted. The region has not been freed from such menaces as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, illegal arms trafficking, aggressive nationalism, and ethnic and religious extremism (Zemskii 1999: 102). The CIS has sought to end civil wars between two minorities (the Ossetians and the Abkhaz) in the Republic of Georgia. Along with the OSCE, the CIS has tried to "make a considerable contribution to ensuring that there is no accidental resumption of hostilities" and thus "has allowed a degree of normalization in Georgia"; however, there was little movement toward a settlement of the dispute in South Ossetia (MacFarlane 1998: 121, 122), neither was there much progress towards a political settlement allowing the return of refugees and the restoration of Georgian jurisdiction in Abkhazia. The hostilities remain unresolved.

In Africa, (sub)regional organizations have also met with fewer successes. The major regional organizations have poor records. The OAU has a history of failure: it chose not to intervene in several conflicts, such as the Nigerian civil war in 1966. When the OAU decided to intervene in Chad between 1980 and 1982, its operation failed. It initially declined the request of the United Nations to intervene in Rwanda, on the grounds that the latter could do better. Although it finally sent military observer missions to Rwanda in the early 1990s and managed to send in 6,000 troops, it failed to prevent the large-scale massacre that occurred there in 1994. Troop deployment was delayed for almost five months. In early 2000, some 16 million people (half of them were in Ethiopia) in 16 states in East Africa still faced starvation. The OAU also failed to prevent or terminate the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which has sapped the strength of their impoverished economies. However, this is not the only war in Africa. The civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo involved about 10,000 troops from Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia supporting Congolese President Laurent Kabila's armed forces against rebels backed by Uganda and Rwanda. US Secretary of State Madelaine Albright even described the war as "Africa's first world war."

Other subregional organizations in Africa have not fared better. The ECOWAS in Liberia (a mission known as the ECOWAS Monitoring Group or ECOMOG) managed to create a political environment conducive to substantially free and fair elections (held on 19 July 1997). Nevertheless, this came at a very high price: during the course of a seven-year intervention, the security situation deteriorated considerably. At the time of ECOMOG's arrival, the civil war had already produced 5,000

deaths and 250,000 refugees. The next seven years, however, witnessed a dramatic rise of casualties – some 150,000 deaths and 700,000 refugees. According to Eric Berman, "[not] only did ECOMOG exacerbate the Liberian civil war, it also undermined regional peace and security" in that it "contributed to the civil war in neighboring Sierra Leone" (Berman 1998: 9). In his view, "Liberians and the region would have been better off without ECOMOG" (Berman 1998: 8). The newest of Africa's seven major subregional organizations, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) – formed in 1992 and whose security and defence commitments can be seen through the 1994 establishment of the Inter-State Defense and Security Committee (or ISDSC) – has not performed effectively. These African institutions have had some positive impact on the region. In 1994, for instance, SADC managed to bring pressure to bear on Lesotho when the military intervened to overthrow a recently elected civilian government. In the mid-1990s, the SADC and the OAU helped to prevent the genocide in Rwanda from spreading into Burundi. The ECOWAS also improved its record when it launched its ECOMOG operation in Sierra Leone at the beginning of February 1998 and ousted the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council/Revolutionary United Front (AFRC/RUF) junta. Unfortunately, these success stories are far too few and may not have a lasting effect.

The OAS as the most successful non-Western security community

In comparative terms, as is described later, the OAS's security-community building efforts have borne more fruit than those of most of the non-Western organizations. The earlier failures of the OAS can be easily explained in terms of its inability to meet most, if not all, of the aforementioned four criteria. These include limited experience in conflict management (criterion 1),[8] large membership size (32 states in the late 1980s; criterion 2), lack of commitment to democratic institutions (criterion 3),[9] and a general unwillingness of member states to endorse American political leadership (criterion 4).[10]

The relative successes of the OAS in recent years seem correlated to its growing ability to meet more of the four criteria. Its relatively successful interventions in member states, such as Guatemala in 1993, reveal that, with more experience in conflict management and democratic intervention, this old organization (formed as the International Union of American Republics in 1890) could better meet criterion 1.

More and more states in the region have also adopted similar policies, based on economic and political liberalism (meeting more of criterion 3). They have gradually implemented liberal market policies. South America's principal rivals – Brazil and Argentina – have become more cooperative after a shift toward market liberalism and the process of democratization has taken root. Every country in the region except Cuba has had democratic elections. In 1977, 14 of the 20 Latin American states were under military rule. In 1997, the number of countries believed to have made their way to democracy was 19. According to Peter Hakim, "[nowhere] in Latin America today is democratic rule threatened by military takeover, as it has been through most of the region's history" (Hakim 1999/2000: 113). Brazilian President Henrique Cardoso, once a leading dependency theorist, converted to economic liberalism. He also calls for "a bolstering of international democratic solidarity among states," as they face "threats of praetorian coups, bigotry, and all kinds of intolerance" (Cardoso 2000: 40). This came at a time after the OAS had come to favour democracy and human rights as liberal norms. In the Santiago commitment of June 1991, for instance, the OAS member states declared their intention to "internationalize issues of domestic governance" and stated that "democracy and human rights are essential to regional identity." In December 1994, the Summit of the Americas further adopted a Declaration of Principles reaffirming the OAS commitment to the active pursuit and defence of democratic institutions in the hemisphere. However, the small number of mature democracies in the region still plagues the OAS. The year 2000 saw worrisome democratic setbacks. The *Washington Post* now bemoans "democracy's decay in Latin America" (*Japan Times*, 6 June 2000: 16). Others also fear a "return of Latin America's strongmen" (*Japan Times*, 5 June 2000: 10).

Fortunately, the OAS region has not openly challenged the leadership of the United States (criterion 4). Unlike the period during the cold war when the unilateral actions of the United States offended OAS members, the last decade has seen better cooperation between them. The adoption of the liberal market model by most Latin American states "has removed many sources of friction that have traditionally set the United States in opposition to Latin America" (Eguizábal 1998: 361). In recent years, the United States has also seemed more determined to uphold human rights and democratic institutions. Mexico, for its part, had been sceptical about using multilateralism to impose such liberal values on states in the region. At the Santiago meeting in June 1991, Mexico successfully opposed a resolution proposing the automatic expulsion from the OAS of any member state whose democratic system was abolished by a *coup d'état*. In 1992, it resisted the attempt to remove the Fujimori government of Peru from the OAS, contending that such a measure would not help to restore democracy. Although Mexico continued to challenge the idea of democratic imposition, its leaders have made a subtle change and soft-

ened their stance. In 1993, for instance, the Mexican government supported the OAS's diplomatic role during the constitutional crisis in Guatemala (Gonzalez and Haggard 1998: 316–317).

Had the United States not intervened militarily in Haiti, the ousted President Aristide would not have been restored to power in 1994. Prior to the US intervention (backed by 20,000 US troops), the UN Security Council had instituted an embargo and frozen funds against the military leadership in Haiti; almost all Latin American countries, as well as France and the United States, violated the embargo, however. The attempt to restore President Aristide to power was eventually successful, mainly because the United States was both willing to take unilateral action (with the blessing of the OAS) and able to accomplish the mission by military means.

Reasons for lack of success in other non-Western regions

Regional organizations in Asia, such as ASEAN (Asia's oldest), appear to be less successful than the OAS in security-community-building efforts. The grouping has met few key criteria. ASEAN is a relatively young organization; although it is only 10 years younger than the EU, its members have not accumulated experience in security matters (criterion 1). During their first ten years together, ASEAN states made few efforts to promote regional cooperation; this came to be known as a "getting-to-know-each-other" period. As discussed later, extraregional powers have done more in helping resolve major security problems in the region.

Although there were only 5 ASEAN members in 1967, this number has since grown to 10, now with a strong possibility of increasing to 11 when newly independent East Timor decides to join the fold (thus meeting less of criterion 2). Regional coordination has been another of ASEAN's problems. Although it is known to be second only to the EU in terms of its success in promoting cooperation among member states, ASEAN has yet to become a defence community capable of conducting joint military operations. The Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia exposed the group's lack of military capabilities and coordination. ASEAN has so far failed to undertake peacemaking, peace-keeping, and peace building operations in its own region. Its members did not even coordinate the national forces they contributed to the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) from 1991 to 1993 (Peou 1998). The ASEAN members continue to disagree on what to do with the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of states and that of consensus-based decision-making. Adherence to decision-by-consensus has meant that collective action still proves elusive: they did not even agree on the need to intervene in East Timor (formerly part of Indonesia).

Moreover, ASEAN has met less of criterion 3. Amitav Acharya is partly correct in stressing that a community project in ASEAN has been undertaken without liberalism and in questioning whether liberalism is a necessary condition for security communities (Acharya 1998). His argument overlooks two factors. Economic liberalism has become a common ideology shared to varying degrees by the ten members (Solingen 1999), including communist Viet Nam and the military in Myanmar. It is worth recalling that the new ASEAN members joined the group after the heads of ASEAN states at the Singapore Summit 1992 agreed to establish the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) by the year 2008. Now with ten members, ASEAN may have become a two-tier institution, divided along economic and ideological lines between the rich and poor as well as between democratic and autocratic members.

If ASEAN has yet to become a security community, it only proves that, without democratic norms fully shared by the members, the possibility that they may be transformed into such a community is limited. Only two of the ten ASEAN member states, Thailand and the Philippines, can be considered to be newly emerging democracies, but they are still ridden with unresolved economic problems. Cambodia and Indonesia have made precarious transitions to democracy, because they remain among the poorest states in the region; the rest are either semi-democracies or full-blown authoritarian states. ASEAN also has two stable illiberal democracies with strong economies: these are Singapore and Malaysia. Three of its members still maintain near-totalitarian rule. The Communist Party in Laos dominates every aspect of political and social life. Viet Nam's system is also similar to that of China, based on Leninism. Myanmar has been ruled by a group of generals who have refused to transfer power to the winner of the election of 1990. The recent economic crises have reduced the progress of most of these countries. If current trends continue, the number of poor people in East Asia is likely to jump from only 40 million to more than 100 million in 2002.

Most importantly, ASEAN has been unable to meet criterion 4: it has never had a competent regional democratic leader. This is not to suggest that ASEAN never had a leader; from the beginning, Indonesia provided de facto leadership. In fact, one leading Asian scholar argues that it was the initiator of ASEAN creation (Anwar 1994). However, since Indonesia became mired in economic and financial crises, ASEAN has been adrift. No one within the group seems willing or able to provide effective democratic leadership. Indonesia, still in transition toward democracy, remains overwhelmingly self-absorbed. Neither democratic Thailand nor the democratic Philippines has played this role. One leading Thai scholar has admitted that "Thailand has been burned on various fronts [when it tried to take a leadership position]" (*Asiaweek*, 1 September 2000: 46).

Wealthy Singapore was both unwilling and unable to take the lead during the Asian economic crisis; Malaysia has turned inward; other autocracies objected to any form of intervention in the domestic affairs of states.

However, the absence of a regional democratic leader in the ASEAN region has been compensated by extraregional democratic states, such as Australia, France, and the United States. During the 10-year Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, the latter enjoyed enormous diplomatic support from the West. The moderate successes of conflict management in the ASEAN region have resulted largely from the work of democratic powers outside the region. The absence of democratic leadership in South-East Asia has constrained its role in conflict management. The UN intervention in Cambodia from 1991 to 1993 stemmed from the new unity of the five Permanent Members (P-5) of the UN Security Council and their active support (Peou 1997, 2000). Between 1991 and 1999, foreign powers (most of which were liberal democracies) spent more than $4 billion on Cambodia. The United Nations has also been actively involved in East Timor. Australia (a mature liberal democracy not in South-East Asia) sent its forces into East Timor with the active support of the P-5 of the UN Security Council. Community-building efforts in East Asia have not taken place in the total absence of a democratic leader. In South-East Asia, no state has ever seriously ignored the need to keep the United States' military presence in the region. ASEAN states have sought to keep the United States in the region by offering naval access agreements.

Much more can be said about less-successful regional organizations in the Arab region. The GCC has not emerged as a security community: its members have failed to meet several key criteria. Although there are few members (only six, thus meeting criterion 2), they have resisted the idea of turning themselves into a security organization. One major problem is that the GCC is younger and less experienced than ASEAN (it was established in the 1980s in response to the Iran–Iraq war). The member states are all oil-rich, Islamic, and share several common historical features (which helped bring them together); these member states remain a club of staunch autocracies (failing criterion 3). They "all are monarchies developed out of tribal political structures, differentiating them from their larger republican neighbors (Iraq, Iran, and Yemen)" (Barnett and Gause 1998: 166–167). Despite its efforts to get into the GCC, North Yemen was turned down, simply because of its republican character.

Another main obstacle to Arab regionalism is that there is no democratic leader capable of leading the region or the council (failing criterion 4). Saudi Arabia is said to be "the logical candidate to be a core state"; however, "to other GCC states it looks less like a core state in a potential security community than it does a hegemon in classical realism" (Barnett and Gause 1998: 191). Saudi Arabia is not a regional democratic leader and is also believed to have even worked against democratizing trends in Kuwait, thus causing other GCC members to distrust it and to regard its potential leadership in the context of power alone.

It is also not difficult to discern why the CIS has been less impressive than ASEAN. The CIS has also failed to meet criterion 1: formed as recently as 1991, the CIS remains a very young organization and still lacks experience in conflict management. It comprises a large number (12) of member states, which are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyztan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikstan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, and thus meets less of criterion 2. Moreover, CIS member states have been unable to act in concert: although they signed the Collective Security Treaty in 1992, the CIS lacks institutional cohesion (Zemskii 1999). The CIS has weakened to the point where one Russian scholar called it "a paper organization."[11] As former communist states, the CIS members still struggle painfully with democratic values. Russia has become more of an illiberal democracy (thus failing criterion 3) (*International Herald Tribune*, 26 June 2000: 8).

The CIS region is fortunate inasmuch as Russia has been both willing and able to play some leadership role in helping to manage civil wars in the region. CIS peace-keeping forces have been predominantly composed of Russian troops and commanded by Russian officers, without whom peace-keeping would not have been possible. Unfortunately, Russia is not a capable regional democratic leader (failing criterion 4). Since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Russia has taken the lead in regional peace-keeping only with the aim of promoting its own strategic interests (MacFarlane 1998). Moscow has been widely perceived as having even encouraged some of the regional conflicts, having done little to promote international norms, and having made little effort to help the adversaries in the CIS reach political compromise. As a leading contributor to peace-keeping in the CIS region, Russia has apparently become less effective. According to Dov Lynch, Russia has shifted from picking sides and meddling with military force to the realization that conflicts in the region have become "costly and dangerous" (Lynch 2000). As an emerging illiberal democracy, Russia has helped dictators to stay in power. Like China, it has routinely defended both Iraq and Serbia in the UN Security Council (*International Herald Tribune*, 26 June 2000: 8).

If Africa appears to be the unlikeliest potential candidate for security-community building, it is mainly because regional organizations in Africa, such as the OAU and ECOWAS, have also met few of the requirements for promoting effective peace-keeping and peace building. Formed in 1963, the OAU is older than ASEAN but younger than the EU. The OAU

ieems unable to meet criterion 1 (experience in conflict management/ esolution). Before the 1980 OAU intervention in Chad, for instance, the organization had no experience in humanitarian actions.

Moreover, the OAU membership size is very large. The original membership was 30 and has grown to include about 50 states by the early 990s, almost as large as the OSCE (thus not effectively meeting criterion 2). The OAU has not been up to the task of coordinating military ctivities. Its role in Chad was hampered by lack of "an institutional and egal structure for an armed intervention" (May and Massey 1998: 51).

Africa has definitely failed to meet criteria 3 and 4. Few states, if any, an be considered mature liberal democracies. The absence of capable emocratic leaders in subregions also poses another major problem to ny community-building efforts. When a regional leader is willing to play leadership role, it does not prove to be effective. Nigeria played the ole of a regional leader (which made interventions in Chad on behalf of ie OAU possible) and took the lead in the Liberian peace operation contributing 80 per cent of the multinational force, when ECOMOG's rength finally reached 12,000 during "Operation Octopus" in October 992). Without Nigeria (and, to a lesser extent, Ghana, with the secondrgest number of troops), no intervention would have been possible. ecause of their relatively small armies, other members were reluctant to ontribute their troops: Senegal pulled out its troops immediately after ine were massacred by the National Patriotic Front of Liberia. The oops from East African states also left Liberia after having realized iat they were exposed to too much danger.

Nigeria has not been a capable democratic leader. Although the curent government was democratically elected, it is unclear whether the emocratic process will grow stronger. Although the country claimed to ave spent $10 billion in the last ten years on peace-keeping, it is also iclear whether the claim is accurate or if the country would have that nd of money to spend on peace-keeping in the future. Nigeria itself had eviously experienced political crises at home (for example, its civil war, hich started in 1966, was probably the most extensive in the region the time) and has since continued to struggle with limited resources Adibe 1998). The country has a legacy of nearly 16 years of military dictorship. Although it is potentially one of Africa's wealthiest countries, e economy has been in a shambles. The late military dictator Sami bacha and his cronies are alleged to have stolen as much as $6 billion in ficial funds from the country over his five-year reign. The country now ars a heavy debt burden of more than $30 billion.

Unlike ASEAN, Africa has not received as much attention as it should ve from leading members of the United Nations. To be fair, the region s seen several UN peace missions in the last ten years, but they came

in either too late or not well equipped to deal with the crises. During the OAU intervention in Chad, for instance, the United Nations not only failed to authorize the interventions but also "appeared unwilling to approve an unprecedented subvention for an operation not under UN control." Neither did the Western states or members of the Council offer any support for funding (May and Massey 1998: 59).[12] Nothing is closer to the truth than the failure of the United Nations to prevent the slaughter of more than half a million civilians in Rwanda. In April 2000, the Security Council accepted responsibility for having failed to stop the massacres and vowed to do more to prevent such atrocities – a vow remaining to be fulfilled. Although the Council has now tried to put the peace process in the Congo back on track by authorizing a 5,500-member peace-keeping force, its commitments remain far less than desirable.

Conclusions

This study has pointed to variation in regional peace and stability. North America and Western Europe have become the most stable regional security communities in the world, whereas regions in the non-Western world have not experienced the same levels of stability and peace. In terms of security-community-building potential among non-Western regions, Latin and Central America have generally become more peaceful and stable than Asia, which has become slightly more stable and peaceful than the GCC and the CIS areas, which in turn have achieved greater stability than Africa.

Variation in regional stability and peace depends on the number of criteria for success in community building that the member states of each region have attained over the years. Table 3.1 shows that North America, the EU, and NATO as security communities have met the most criteria, followed by the OSCE, OAS, ASEAN, GCC, CIS, and African organizations.

Among the four criteria identified in this study, democratic values/performance within a regional organization (criterion 3) and the presence of democratic leadership (criterion 4) are most fundamental to security-community building. Although experience in conflict management (criterion 1) matters, it is, in itself, not the best answer to regional instability. Membership size (criterion 2) is much more important to regional community building, but not the most decisive one: neither ASEAN nor the GCC has developed into a stable security community, despite the fact that each has a small number of members compared with the other regional organizations. Where there is only an attempt to build a regional security community whose members do not share democratic

Table 3.1 Comparison of the community-building criteria of regional organizations

Criteria	Region[a]								
	Western			Non-Western					
	NA	EU	NATO	OSCE	OAS	ASEAN	GCC	CIS	OAU[b]
Experience in conflict management	XXX[c]	XXX	XX(X)	XX	XX	XX	X	X	X
Membership size	XXX	XX	XX	X	X	XX	XX	XX	X
Democratic values/ performance	XXX	XXX	XXX	XX	XX	X	X	X	X
Democratic leadership	XXX	XXX	XXX	XX	XX	X	X	X	X
Total no. of Xs[d]	12	11	10	7	7	6	5	5	4

a. NA, North America; EU, European Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OSCE, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; OAS, Organization of American States; ASEAN, Association of South-East Asian Nations; GCC, Gulf Cooperation Council; CIS, Commonwealth of Independent States; OAU, Organization of African Unity.
b. This includes other African subregional organizations, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS).
c. XXX = very strong; XX = strong; X = weak.
d. The more Xs for a region, the better the quality of security community the region is likely to experience.

values, the prospect for success is slimmer (criterion 3). Non-Western regions have not fully met criterion 4.

Where there are democracies without a capable democratic leader, nascent security communities will not prosper. Not surprisingly, only North America and Western Europe have fulfilled this criterion. The question of leadership has now been recognized by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who made it clear that "unless the Security Council is restored to its pre-eminent position as the sole source of legitimacy on the use of force, we are on a dangerous path to anarchy" (*International Herald Tribune*, 22 November 1999: 10). This implies a need for effective leadership and (more importantly) one to be provided by stable liberal democracies. To help promote global governance, the Council will need to have more permanent members that are liberal democracies, to ensure more effective collective action.

To promote global governance through security-community building, the United Nations and stable liberal democracies in the Western regions may have to think creatively about how to help transform powerful regional states – such as China (in Asia), Russia (in the CIS region), and Nigeria (in Africa) – into stable democracies. (This is not to promote liberal imperialism or excessive military intervention by powerful liberal democracies.) Until that happens, however, leading Western democracies need to engage and/or restrain potentially aggressive non-democratic states and should stay closely involved by doing more to encourage the growth of small non-Western organizations.

Notes

1. See "An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace Building. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992." UN Document, A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June 1992, para. 21. "The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa. Report of the Secretary-General to the United Nations Security Council." UN Document A/52/871-S/1998/318, 16 April 1998, para. 63.
2. "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations." UN Document A/55/305, S/2000/809, 17 August 2000, p. viii.
3. As of 15 June 1999, 24 member states were in arrears under the terms of Article 19 of the UN Charter, which states that any member with arrears equal to two years of assessments will automatically lose its vote in the UN General Assembly. The USA still owed the United Nations over $1.3 billion.
4. Some scholars, such as Amitav Acharya, adopt a sociological perspective in their contention that security communities can also be built on a non-liberal foundation. This point is discussed later in the chapter.
5. The role of political leadership is acknowledged in this study. Not all realists believe that states always balance against power. Stephen Walt argues that states balance against threats and "bandwagon" with any power that does not threaten them (Walt 1995). Randall Schweller argues that states bandwagon with powerful states when they are opportunistic as well as when they are threatened (Schweller 1995). Even Kantian internationalists such as Michael Doyle recognize the importance of power distribution and leadership. According to Doyle, "independent and more substantial European and Japanese military forces pose problems for liberal cooperation" (Doyle 1996: 28). Constructivist thinking is not free from power considerations, either. Alexander Wendt, for instance, accepts that the impact of great powers remains fundamental in international politics: "[I]t is the great powers, the states with the greatest national means, that may have the hardest time learning this lesson," whereas "small powers do not have the luxury of relying on national means and may therefore learn faster that collective recognition is a cornerstone of security" (Wendt 1995: 153). In their book *Security Communities*, Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett also argue that "the study of security communities offers a blend of *idealism* ... and *realism*" (Adler and Barnett 1998: 14) (italics original). More importantly, constructivists are pro-status quo in the sense that their understanding of peaceful change does not rest on a vision based on the idea of

equalizing power asymmetries among the member states of a particular security community. Mutual trust and collective identity do not negate the fact that some of their members are more powerful. In this context, trust- and identity-building processes are not independent from power relations. As Adler and Barnett put it: "[P]ower can be a magnet; a community formed around a group of strong powers creates the expectations that weaker states will be able to enjoy the security and potentially other benefits that are associated with that community." In other words, "those powerful states who belong to the core of strength do not create security *per se*; rather, because of their positive images of security or material progress that are associated with powerful and successful states, security communities develop around them" (Adler and Barnett 1998: 40). They further contend that "the development of a security community is not antagonistic to the language of power; indeed, it is *dependent on* it" (Adler and Barnett 1998: 52) (italics added).

James Meernik (1996), for instance, found that if the US President declares democracy as a goal of the intervention and if the US government is opposed to the targeted regime, democracy is likely to be promoted.

Cf. Table 3.1.

According to Neil MacFarlane and Thomas Weiss, its "main experience was as an American surrogate in 1968 for the so-called peacekeeping operation in the Dominican Republic." Neil MacFarlane and Thomas Weiss, "The United Nations, Regional Organization and Human Security: Building Theory in Central America," (MacFarlane and Weiss 1994: 289).

In the early 1980s, the OAS General Assembly refused to comment on human rights abuses in Chile and Argentina. Later, the OAS condemned General Manuel Noriega and his regime for "grave events and abuses" and urged him to transfer power "with complete respect for the sovereign will of the Panamanian people." However, most members were not committed to the defence of human rights and democratic institutions. As described later, it was not until June 1991 that they began to accept human and democratic rights as liberal norms to guide their action.

This was the case for Panama, where the OAS Permanent Council condemned the US invasion in 1989.

Professor Sergei M. Plekhanov of York University, Toronto; personal discussion, 30 July 1999.

Generally, (sub)regional institutions in Africa do not enjoy high degrees of international legitimacy or credibility. They often act or intervene in other countries without authorization from the Security Council. This was also the case with the Great Lakes region, where the military involvement of Angola, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe in the Democratic Republic of Congo's domestic conflict received no active responses from the Security Council.

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4

Economic globalization and global governance: Towards a post-Washington Consensus?[1]

Richard Higgott

Introduction

At first glance, a chapter focusing on the relationship between market forces and governance seems like an exercise in confusion, if not contradiction. For many observers, "the market" implies the opposite of "governance." This at least has been the credo of the "free" market during its intellectual-cum-ideological hegemony of the last two decades. Yet even at the height of a neo-liberal understanding of economic globalization that characterized the post-cold-war world of the first half of the 1990s, such a stark polarization was always misleading. Markets, as Karl Polanyi (1994) told us a long time ago, have always been socially constructed.

Only since the rapid expansion and deregulation of the global financial markets over the last decade, driven by advances in technology and communication, which saw daily financial flows grow from something like $200 million per day in the mid-1980s to $1.5 trillion per day in the late 1990s (Beddoes 1999: 16), have we begun to assume that market power has totally escaped the jurisdiction of state authority.[2] Furthermore, only since the financial crises of 1997 have influential policy makers (as opposed to largely uninfluential scholarly analysts of a "market-sceptical" persuasion) begun to think that this might be functionally problematic and in need of serious political (as opposed to economic) attention. The early twenty-first century is a period of intellectual rethinking about the relationship between the market and the state.