

The UN, Peacekeeping and Collective Human Security: From *An Agenda for Peace* to the Brahimi Report

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The study of peace operations has grown substantially, in large part due to the increasing number of UN missions to conflict-ridden states since the end of the Cold War in the 1990s. Much of what has been written tends to focus on the rising policy-making demand for peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and humanitarian intervention. Policy makers in national governments and international agencies alike have had to deal with intra-state conflicts and their humanitarian effects by concentrating on the planning, design, and implementation of peace missions. Overall, the literature on peace operations is said to suffer from what Roland Paris calls a 'cult of policy relevance' to the neglect of meta-theoretical insights found in the political science literature.¹ To a large extent, this is a fair assessment. Between March and December 2000 alone, the UN put out several major reports with over 300 recommendations on how to enhance UN capacities in undertaking peace operations.²

UN peace operations should, however, be seen as part of a broader theoretical framework based on the novel concept of 'collective human security'. The concept became an integral part of positive peace and gave new direction for the peace movements from the 1980s. *An Agenda for Peace*, first published in 1992 by Boutros Boutros-Ghali has further given rise to new thinking about human security. The Brahimi Report (2000) then expands on this vision for world peace and remains part of the idealist faith in the potential for human emancipation. The concept of collective human security embedded in recent UN thinking differs from that of national security: the former focuses on the individual, as opposed to the latter whose emphasis is placed on the state, as the referent point for security. At the same time, the UN vision for human security should be viewed in collective terms: it not only stresses the need to meet basic human needs and to promote distributive justice and political participation but also points out that human security can be achieved through collective intervention action.

The new UN vision for world peace, therefore, challenges the traditional value of order, which rejects interventionism, and expands universal values that acknowledge the unity of humanity, such as social justice, democracy, human rights and humanitarian intervention.

This essay argues that 'collective human security' has challenged the traditional concept of national security, but the UN will need to think more seriously about how to overcome the existing hurdles, also acknowledged in the Brahimi Report.

Why the Brahimi Report? Some Background

The Brahimi Report was a byproduct of the UN leadership's dimming vision to build world peace inspired by *An Agenda for Peace*, which lays the conceptual foundation of collective human security, and resulted from the UN failure to turn that vision into reality. A brief discussion of *An Agenda for Peace* helps shed light on this point. In the aftermath of the Cold War, this landmark report took a bold step in defiance of the realist conception of national security rooted in selfish human nature and international anarchy. It took into account the persisting problems of social injustice and violent culture as independent variables explaining war and violence. It envisaged a system of security that de-emphasized the need to serve the interests of powerful states (a realist understanding of international politics)³ and considered viable institutional constraints on war-prone state behaviour (a neo-liberal promise for peace).⁴ Furthermore, *An Agenda for Peace* presents a genuine challenge to the internationalist, legalistic concept of state sovereignty-based collective security (rooted in the Wilsonian logic of balancing aggression against member states).

The state is no longer seen as the absolute referent point for security. Although Boutros-Ghali took a cautious approach by reaffirming that 'in...situations of internal crisis, the United Nations will need to respect the sovereignty of states',⁵ he points out that '[the] time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty...has passed. Its theory was never matched by reality.' He added: 'It is the task of leaders of states today to understand this and to find a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world.'⁶ The UN vision for world peace is built upon the growing realization that inter-state conflict is on the wane and that intra-state conflict has grown more prevalent. The concept of peace in *An Agenda for Peace* was not simply the absence of war between member states. It favours the concept of 'human security',⁷ closely related to the radical concept of positive peace associated with social

justice and democracy, rather than the traditional concept of national security. Human security is, in broad terms, 'freedom from want' and 'freedom from fear' with reference to individual human beings, not states, as the referent object for security. When it comes to the question of what is being secured against, however, human security is also subject to interpretation.⁸

Particularly noteworthy in *An Agenda for Peace* is the UN's renewed commitment to the protection of human rights with special sensitivity to those of ethnic, religious, social and linguistic minorities. This implies that individuals' rights as human beings are legitimate and cannot be made subservient to states' rights under the tradition of international law based on state sovereignty. Human rights law, although still unenforceable, poses a new challenge to the traditional conception of international society and gives rise to the idea of global community based on the rule of law.

As to the question of what is being secured against, *An Agenda for Peace* provides a comprehensive perspective. Human insecurity includes deprivation of basic human needs rooted in ecological damage, disruption of family and community life, unchecked population growth, crushing debt burdens, barriers to trade, and the growing disparity between rich and poor.⁹ Human security also looks beyond the fierce new assertions of nationalism and sovereignty to include brutal ethnic, religious, social, cultural or linguistic strife, seen as threatening the cohesion of states. The threats to 'social peace' include actions against human welfare: greater intrusion into the lives and rights of individuals, new assertions of discrimination and exclusion, and lack of democratic participation. Unconventional sources of insecurity are also acknowledged; they include drug trafficking and acts of terrorism seeking to undermine evolution and change through democratic means. In the broadest possible sense, 'the deepest causes of conflict include economic despair, social injustice, and political oppression'.¹⁰

On the question of who provides for security, *An Agenda for Peace* advocates collective action broader than conventional state-centric collective security. The organization is now seen as more than a community of independent states led by the Security Council entrusted with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The UN represents a global community where the General Assembly and all the functional elements of the UN system share this collective responsibility and where regional and non-governmental organizations also play a role in an integrated approach to human security.¹¹

On the question of what methods are to be undertaken to provide for security, *An Agenda for Peace* partly rests on an optimistic

assessment that global trends favour liberal ideas. That is, 'authoritarian regimes have given way to more democratic forces and responsive Governments'.¹² Democracy is also possible within a community of nations: 'Democracy at all levels is essential to attain peace for a new era of prosperity and justice'.¹³ *An Agenda for Peace* thus calls for collective action to achieve this end.

An Agenda for Peace's strategy for peace becomes more intrusive: it ranges from preventive diplomacy to peacemaking to peacekeeping to peacebuilding to humanitarian intervention – all of which aim to build human security. Logically, *An Agenda for Peace* advocates the need for military enforcement of humanitarian aid delivery and its proactive support of forceful humanitarian interventionism. The idea of law enforcement is implicit in *An Agenda for Peace*, whose 1992 version makes scant reference to humanitarian assistance to civilians during continuing warfare and in designated areas; however, the 1995 version gives more serious thought to this operation.¹⁴ The UN under the leadership of Boutros-Ghali also sought better ways to enhance UN peace operations by proposing a 'rapid deployment force', which might comprise battalion-sized units from a number of countries.¹⁵ It makes sense to conceptualize the UN strategy for peace as collective human security.

How close has UN idealism come to reality? UN peace operations have multiplied. Since the late 1980s, the UN has also sought to transform political systems in war-torn countries by getting warring parties to reach a democratic agreement, by organizing free and fair elections, by helping to create democratic institutions, and by assisting in the process of reforming domestic economies. The UN has made efforts to enforce humanitarian and human rights law. In 1993, the UN Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, where the former president of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, now stands trial. In 1994, it also created the International Criminal Court for Rwanda. The UN can apply humanitarian law and hold violators of human rights accountable for their actions. The UN has also put considerable pressure on Cambodia to bring to justice Khmer Rouge leaders who committed crimes against humanity during their 1975–78 reign of terror. Kofi Anann observed that in the worst cases of human rights abuse, state sovereignty may have to give way to higher, humanitarian precepts.

To date, however, not all has gone to plan. *An Agenda for Peace* has had a limited impact on global peace in general. By 1995, Boutros-Ghali had become less upbeat about his agenda for peace in his acknowledgement that neither the Security Council nor the Secretary-

General had the capacity to take enforcement action 'except perhaps on a very limited scale'. He then added that 'the financial foundations of the Organization daily grew weaker, debilitating its political will and practical capacity to undertake new and essential activities',¹⁶ and that 'the Organization is resource-starved and hard pressed to handle the less demanding peacemaking and peacekeeping responsibilities'.¹⁷ At the end of the twentieth century, the UN had failed to deliver on its promises.

The Brahimi Report begins with a reminder of the UN Charter's original objective – 'to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war' – but acknowledges that the organization 'has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge'. In its admirably frank assessment of the UN's existing capabilities, the Report admits that it 'can do no better today'.¹⁸ Unsurprisingly, the Report offers more recommendations to enhance its capacities.

The Brahimi Report's Renewed Vision for Collective Human Security

The report was the byproduct of a series of brainstorming sessions among prominent practitioners, aimed at finding better ways to improve future UN peace operations.¹⁹ The ultimate goal of this report is to enable the UN to promote global peace and security based the novel concept of collective human security.

The report seriously questions the traditional argument that the state is the only legitimate provider of security. Its overall conceptual framework fits more comfortably with the logic of collective human security; while it does not totally reject the traditional role of member states in international peace and security, the report refers to the UN as 'the universal organization', not simply as an international organization. The UN is urged to take the initiative 'to reach out to the institutions of civil society and to strengthen relations with non-governmental organizations, academic institutions, and the media, who can be useful partners in the promotion of peace and security for all'. In its words: 'People everywhere are fully entitled to consider that it is their organization, and as such to pass judgment on its activities and the people who serve in it'.²⁰

The report's approach to security builds on three basic methods that can also be found in *An Agenda for Peace*: conflict prevention and peacemaking, peacebuilding and peacekeeping, all of which can be integrated to make peace operations more effective. Conflict prevention and peacemaking are conventional methods of conflict resolution but receive little attention in the report. Conflict prevention

is based on diplomatic efforts aimed at addressing structural sources of conflict in order to build a solid foundation for peace. Peacemaking depends on diplomacy and mediation as tools employed by individuals or groups in an attempt to bring to a halt conflicts in progress. Although the concept of collective human security is not explicit in the report, what the Panel has in mind is not simply a peace process leading to the end of inter-state or intra-state violence and war. In its vision to promote human security through collective action, particularly peacekeeping and peacebuilding, the report views peace operations as multidimensional and urges the UN to give more attention to the need for developing inseparable partnership between peacekeepers and peacebuilders.

As a method for promoting human security, peacebuilding includes, but is not limited to, meeting basic human needs, such as education and a demonstrable improvement in the quality of life for people in peace mission areas. More notably, this method is social, legal and political in its orientation: reintegrating former combatants into civil society, strengthening the rule of law, improving respect for human rights and providing technical assistance for democratic development. The report sees the need to include sufficient numbers of international judicial experts, penal experts and human-rights specialists to help strengthen domestic rule-of-law institutions.²¹ The Report also makes it clear that 'Free and fair' elections should be held with a view to strengthening governance institutions and that they 'need the support of a broader process of democratization and civil society building that includes effective civilian governance and a culture of respect for basic human rights'. Elections should not 'merely ratify a tyranny of the majority or be overturned by force after a peace operation leaves'.²² Furthermore, peacebuilding includes actions dealing with unconventional security issues, such as landmines and health.

The report also devotes considerable attention to the role of peacekeeping in promoting human security. The UN must have capacities to deploy its peace operations rapidly and effectively. According to the report, the first six to twelve weeks following a ceasefire or peace accord is often the most critical period for establishing both a stable peace and the credibility of the peacekeepers.²³ Although it recognizes variations in timelines for rapid and effective deployment, the Panel proposes that traditional peacekeeping operations be fully deployed within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution, and complex peace operations and their mission headquarters within 90 and 15 days, respectively. The report recommends that a revolving 'on-call' list' of about 100 military officers

and 100 police officers be created in the Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) to be available on seven days' notice.

When asked, the report insists, the universal organization must have its international forces 'prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence, with the ability and determination to defeat them'. The UN should thus be able to deploy 5,000 troops 'as a brigade formation, not as a collection of battalions that are unfamiliar with one another's doctrine, leadership and operational practices'. They should come from a group of countries that have been working together and could 'develop common training, equipment standards, common doctrine, and common arrangements for the operational control of the force'.²⁴ The report thus makes it clear that the UN should not be asked to undertake international peace operations in too many places. Moreover, the report stresses the need to ensure compatibility between clear, credible and achievable mandates on the one hand and capabilities on the other. Clear, credible and achievable mandates should contain several components. They should meet such threshold conditions as consistency with international human-rights standards and practicability of specified tasks and timelines. The UN Security Council's draft resolutions should authorize missions with sizeable troop levels. The requirements of peacekeeping operations in potentially dangerous situations should meet such needs as a clear chain of command and unity of effort. When formulating or changing mission mandates, the Secretariat must tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear.²⁵

Perhaps the most significant aspect in the report is the section on 'implications for peacekeeping doctrine and strategy'. On the one hand, the report recognizes that the UN 'does not wage war'²⁶ and reaffirms the doctrine of peacekeeping, where the consent of adversaries, and peacekeepers' impartiality and their right to self-defence 'should remain the bedrock principles'.²⁷ It does not endorse enforcement, for such action 'has consistently been entrusted to coalitions of willing States, with the authorization of the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter'.²⁸

On the other hand, the report seeks to modify the doctrine by moving in the direction of collective peace enforcement, echoing Secretary-General Kofi Anann's earlier calls for the use of force against evil. Inconspicuously worded, one of the panel's recommendations envisages UN peacekeepers balancing against aggression. The principles of consent and impartiality can no longer be taken for granted. Peacekeepers must not only adopt the principle of extended deterrence by defending themselves, other mission components and

their mandates, but they must also be equipped and empowered to fight aggressors. Peacekeepers may reject 'a policy of appeasement' by not adhering to the principle of impartiality – that is, the UN should not be equal in the way it 'treat[s] all parties in all cases for all times'.²⁹ The report makes a clear distinction between 'obvious aggressors' and 'victims' defined in moral terms: it is based on the understanding that 'local parties' are not always 'moral equals'.³⁰ This distinction is compatible with the concept of collective security defined in terms of balancing against aggression,³¹ and justifies the collective use of force on both operational and moral grounds. The report relies on the Security Council's Resolution 1296 (2000), which states that 'the targeting of civilians in armed conflict and the denial of humanitarian access to civilian populations afflicted by war may themselves constitute threats to international peace and security'. The UN's peace strategy then 'must not apply best-case planning assumptions to situations where the local actors have historically exhibited worst-case behavior', and its 'mandates should specify an operation's authority to use force'.³² The report also makes it clear that 'United Nations forces for complex operations should be sized and configured so as to leave no doubt in the minds of would-be spoilers as to which of the two approaches the Organization has adopted'. Also, '[such] forces should be afforded the field intelligence and other capabilities needed to mount a defense against violent challenges'³³ and should thus be able to 'oppose obvious evil', such as that which took place in Rwanda.³⁴

The report further recommends that the UN headquarters be better equipped to deal with violence and war around the world. To prevent conflict, according to the report, the UN will need an Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS) to be involved in intelligence-gathering or fact-finding aimed at accumulating knowledge about conflict situations. The ECPS is also asked to present a plan to strengthen the permanent capacity of the UN to develop peace-building strategies and to implement programmes in support of those strategies. More financial resources for headquarters support offices (whose total costs do not exceed \$50 million per year and represent 2 per cent of the peacekeeping costs) are needed. The report also makes clear that a larger staff is necessary. At present, the UN headquarters employs only 32 officers who provide military planning and guidance to 27,000 troops in the field, 9 civilian police who provide guidance for up to 8,600 police, and 15 political desk officers for 14 current operations and 2 new ones.³⁵

The method of selecting effective mission leaders should be systematic, beginning with the compilation of a comprehensive list of responsible individuals, who should be assembled as early as possible and who should receive strategic guidance and plans for anticipating and overcoming challenges to mandate implementation.

The report also calls for further steps to be taken to ensure effective action and better coordination among the UN Secretariat's key implementing departments in peace and security, including the establishment of Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs). Staff seconded to them should come from throughout the UN system; they should plan new missions and help them reach full deployment. The panelists also see the need to make structural adjustments within and without the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and outside the UN Secretariat. Within the DPKO, the Military and Civilian Division should be reorganized into two separate divisions; the Field Administration and Logistics Division should also be divided into two. The existing Lessons Learned Unit should be strengthened and put in the DPKO Office of Operations. The number of Assistant Secretaries-General in the DPKO should be increased from two to three. Outside the DPKO, there should be a unit for operational planning and support of public information in peace operations. Public information planning and support at headquarters and elements of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), particularly the electoral unit, should also be strengthened. The ability of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to plan and support the human-rights components of peace operations would need to be further reinforced.³⁶

In short, the Brahimi Report's vision fits nicely with the concept of collective human security, as its authors endeavour to bring the UN vision outlined in *An Agenda for Peace* closer to reality by offering more concrete steps towards building world peace. The panel's vision rests on the faith that the UN as a universal organization should be capable of playing a deeper role in the defence of universal moral standards embedded in the concept of positive peace associated with human security. The question is whether the report will achieve what *An Agenda for Peace* has not.

Overall, the Brahimi Report is moving in the right direction. The Report has now received a comprehensive review offering more modest, more cautious recommendations for implementation. In his report dated 28 May 2001, Kofi Anann expresses his support for most of the recommendations made by the Brahimi-led team but cautioned and recommended against others. Among them are the Brahimi Report's proposal that procurement and budgeting authority be

delegated from the Department of Management to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and his proposal that a small new multidisciplinary policy and analysis unit be a more modest alternative to EISAS. Although the Secretary-General proposes three options that would enable the UN to deploy peacekeeping operations effectively within 30–90-day timeframes, he warns that none of them would achieve this objective. He further states that ‘this can only be achieved by the provision of fully self-sustaining and completely self-sufficient troops provided by Member States with the means to do so’.³⁷

Ultimately, both the Brahimi-led team and Kofi Annan agree on two major challenges: for the UN to perform its tasks as recommended, it would need the full support of both the Security Council and the member states; it would also depend on the parties to conflict themselves. The Secretariat can only do its part. The question then is whether member states will be willing to do all that is required to ensure that peace operations succeed and whether parties to conflict will cooperate with the UN. We have no way of predicting what states and other global actors would do in the future, but the UN vision for world peace raises several difficult questions to be discussed next.

The Challenge for Collective Human Security

History, theoretical insights, and existing evidence still show that states in today’s world are unlikely to take rapid collective action to provide security as a global public good. It is unclear whether the UN’s recommendations on structural adjustments within the UN system, even if fully implemented, would make peace operations truly effective. The UN would still be in no position to carry out a NATO-type operation in war zones. For the UN to be able to act rapidly, as recommended by the report, it must be equipped with the capacity to coordinate airlift operations. But this key aspect of effective peace operations receives no attention in the report. Ultimately the UN would have to rely on powerful states’ cooperation. The fact that collective action among UN members in a multipolar world – a world that is now emerging in realists’ eyes³⁸ – makes it harder for states to overcome the problem of free riding.³⁹ Yet a multipolar world will make it harder for the UN to mobilize and coordinate troops from different UN members on an ad hoc, collective basis.⁴⁰ The UN has now grown to 189 members, which has already complicated its ability to coordinate their activities. If more numerous non-state actors get actively involved in the planning and implementing process, there is no guarantee for effective coordination among peacebuilders. If a multipolar world is also based on

multiculturalism,⁴¹ the challenge for human emancipation defined in universal terms becomes even greater. Still another serious challenge to collective action lies in the fact that sources of insecurity have fast multiplied, ranging from conventional to unconventional threats to human welfare.

There is also ample scepticism about states' willingness to take collective action at their own expense to provide security to the citizens of other states. State sovereignty may have now become less absolute, as Boutros-Ghali indicates, but it has not been 'wholly subverted'.⁴² Whether states will become more idealistic in their commitment to the UN vision for world peace remains to be seen.⁴³ The Brahimi Report also recognizes the limits of states' willingness to make sacrifices. In its words: 'Reluctance to accept [the risks of casualties] has grown since the difficult missions of the mid-1990s, partly because Member States are not clear about how to define their national interests in taking such risks and partly because they may be unclear about the risks themselves'.⁴⁴

If we compare the levels of willingness and commitment by four different types of UN member states – poor/developing, wealthy/developed, powerful and democratic – it becomes clear that none of them is likely to be of greater assistance to the UN in peace operations, and this immediately calls into question the viability of a multilateral system of peace and security on a grand scale. Poor states are unable to do much. On financial grounds, poor states are simply incapable of making any meaningful contributions. Developing countries have done more than developed countries in terms of troop contributions (77 per cent of the troops deployed in UN operations, as of the end of June 2000, came from developing countries),⁴⁵ but they depend heavily on the latter's financial support.

Evidence also shows that wealthy states have become less politically and financially responsible since the Cold War ended, despite their tendencies to dominate the UN system. According to the Brahimi Report, 'no developed country currently contributes troops to the most difficult United Nations-led peacekeeping operations from a security perspective, namely the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)'.⁴⁶ To be fair, developed states have paid most of the bills for UN peace operations, which amount to about \$100 billion in the 1990s. But they have since done less. The United States remains among the most financially delinquent UN members. It is also unclear whether Japan will continue to contribute as much as it has; it has complained about making more financial contributions to the UN than four of the five permanent

members of the Security Council (China, France, Russia and the United Kingdom), although it is itself not a permanent member. Most worrisome, developed countries' foreign aid has declined noticeably in recent years: they have done less, not more, to help alleviate socioeconomic conditions in poor countries, despite their pledges in 1997 to relieve the latter's debt burdens.⁴⁷

More powerful states – the third type – are even less willing to contribute their troops to UN peace operations. In the recent past, they viewed the security of small states as a non-issue in international relations.⁴⁸ The permanent members of the Security Council have contributed few troops to peace operations. They often fail to agree on peacekeeping requirements. The Council failed to act quickly in Rwanda, even when reliably informed that violence was already under way. Rather than adding more troops to the existing 2,500-strong peacekeeping force, as requested in 1994, the Council cut the number to a tenth. The same can be said about the Council's actions on the Bosnian war: when Boutros-Ghali asked for 34,000 troops, the Council gave him only 7,400. The Council also hesitated to send troops to deter widespread violence in East Timor. Whenever they make substantial contributions, they do so within their regional strategic alliances. Three of the permanent members (France, Britain and the US), for instance, have contributed sizeable forces to the NATO-led forces in the Balkans.

Liberal democracies – the fourth type – have not been entirely reliable, either. In theory, they should be willing to act in defence of human freedom.⁴⁹ When they put clear emphasis on the promotion of democracy, liberal states can help achieve this objective.⁵⁰ But when one examines the level of sacrifice by liberal democracies, evidence remains far from conclusive. Liberal democracies may be slow in taking action because of the difficulties they have 'in convincing their national legislatures and public that they should support the deployment of their troops to United Nations-led operations'.⁵¹

Evidently, the military involvement of democratic states still largely depends on whether or not their interests are at stake. The Brahimi Report takes note of this problem, as developed and democratic countries 'tend not to see their strategic interests at stake'. They have devoted most of their well-trained, well-equipped national military forces to keeping the peace in the Balkans and neglected much-needed peace operations in other regions.⁵² Africa, where nearly two-thirds of the 100,000 people killed in worldwide conflicts during the period of January–August 2000, has received the least attention from democratic states. The report bemoans the reality of this situation: 'NATO military

planners would not have agreed to deploy to Sierra Leone with only the 6,000 troops initially authorized...the likelihood of a KFOR-type operation being deployed in Africa in the near future seems remote given the current trends'.⁵³

It remains unclear how the new UN vision can offer an effective strategy even for negative peace (an end to armed conflict), not to mention positive peace. The doctrinal shift from traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement in the form of coercive humanitarian intervention remains conceptually problematic.

If the UN is unable to deploy its troops promptly, it is unlikely to prevent massive political violence, which 'can be inflicted faster than the West can learn of and deploy intervention forces to stop it'. Even 'if the West relies mainly on military intervention to prevent genocide and ethnic cleansing, it is doomed to failure', and to 'stop such violence, the West must concentrate on averting its outbreak in the first place'.⁵⁴ Unfortunately, less powerful, poor or war-torn states often find any form of political or military interventionism threatening. Connie Peck complains about the lack of progress after *An Agenda for Peace*. She asserts that the clash between UN hawks (sceptics of 'preventive diplomacy') and UN doves (those who think that the concept would permit great power domination and intervention encouraging 'the thin end of another neo-colonial wedge') has stood in the way of real change.⁵⁵ During a series of dialogues in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Europe held in February and March 2001, representatives from the non-European regions expressed scepticism about what the UN can do. Representatives from Latin America, especially those from larger and wealthier states, expressed a degree of distrust of UN conflict prevention and humanitarian intervention. Latin American states are committed to the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs by outside powers. Participants from Africa questioned the commitment of the UN and the great powers to helping Africa and called for the strengthening of Africa's own capacity for conflict management and peace operations.⁵⁶ In Asia, the role of regional organizations in managing intra-state conflicts, such as those in Aceh of Indonesia and Sri Lanka, received more attention than that of the UN. The ten-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) remains committed to non-interference in the domestic affairs of states by outside powers. The proposed EISAS has already been sidelined, as the Secretary-General preferred to wait for 'further study' – an indication that some member states found it alarming.⁵⁷

Military intervention may even perpetuate struggles for power among adversaries and most likely leads to failure. Connie Peck makes

an excellent point: 'coercion is often met with counter-coercion and "reactance". Counter-coercion simply means that the side uses power tactics in return, setting off a power struggle'.⁵⁸ When used to compel one party or another to submit, power is seen as counter-productive. Victory through military submission and defeat within war-torn states does not even guarantee negative peace. Between 1989 and 1993, such victory was achieved in only 17 of 41 cases of conflict termination and it remains precarious, but 'victory in a large number of cases turns out to be elusive and more difficult than expected'.⁵⁹

Caught in a security dilemma, armed adversaries are more concerned about the immediate threat to their survival and security than about what the UN might do to them in the future. According to Robert Paper, punishment 'is likely to succeed only when the [target actors'] resolve is low'.⁶⁰ Denial, which should be part of the strategy of compellance, works better than punishment.⁶¹ When compulsion is necessary, the objective is not to punish, but to prevent target actors from achieving their goals by ruining target actors' capabilities 'in ways that undermine [their] expectations of military successes', including supply lines and communication networks.⁶² Unless the UN is sufficiently equipped to wage a large-scale war (as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was in Kosovo in 1999), military operations involve enormous risks:⁶³ such forceful intervention tends to create its own dynamic of escalating violence.⁶⁴

Moreover, it remains unclear that forceful intervention can effectively build positive peace in the short or immediate term. Most, if not all, adversaries in violent conflict have violated human rights in varying degrees. If applied consistently, the human-rights perspective that seeks to promote positive peace retributively may work against negative peace. The paradox in the logic of democratic/human rights and that of peacekeeping poses a question of how the two can be reconciled. Will human-rights violators mired in violent conflict be willing to welcome UN peace operations?

Even if the UN succeeds in balancing aggression, it remains unclear how human security can be promoted collectively. John Ruggie, for instance, argues that the 'balance of forces' in Cambodia 'created enough space for the UN operation to pursue its non-military objectives, including the repatriation of refugees and conducting a nation-wide election to constitute a legitimate government'.⁶⁵ Cambodia has now become more stable under the dominant leadership of Hun Sen, who came to power in 1979, but the UN intervention in the early 1990s did not end the war, which continued until 1998. Since early 1991, the donor community has spent close to US\$5 billion on

Cambodia, but its nascent democracy remains precarious and the violation of human rights continues. The country has also become Southeast Asia's most attractive place for transnational crime. As another example, in Kosovo, whether the KLA will be willing and able to promote democratic and human rights after NATO leaves one day remains a big question mark.

One problem that often stands in the way of reaching democratic compromise is the persistence of asymmetrical power relations among adversaries. Both proponents of democratic peace and realists can agree on some democratic realism: a certain balance of power may be a key prerequisite for peace and democratic emergence. There are liberal thinkers, such as Bruce Russett, who remain convinced that liberal norms – democratic norms of conflict resolution, such as respect for minority rights – may be more powerful than structural and institutional constraints.⁶⁶ At the same time, Russett concedes that norms 'may be violated and break down'.⁶⁷ Just as institutional constraints – a structure of powers, checks and balances – could make it more difficult for democratic leaders to initiate war, they could also make it harder for political leaders to resort to repressive violence against their own citizens.⁶⁸ In war-torn and authoritarian states, institutional checks and balances do not exist; only warring factions do. If the logic of institutional checks and balances applies, a certain balance of factional force may be a precondition for democratic emergence. Lake and Rothchild make a good observation: 'When the balance of ethnic power remains stable ... well-crafted contracts enable ethnic groups to avoid conflict despite their differing policy preferences'.⁶⁹

Unfortunately, military action against aggression often works against the logic of democratic balancing. By seeking to punish peace 'spoilors' for their uncooperative behaviour, the UN may not necessarily succeed in building and nurturing democracy. In transnational conflict, it is often difficult to determine the aggressor in the first place.⁷⁰ Even if the aggressor can be clearly identified, it remains unclear if military action against it will lead to democracy. Both Lake and Rothchild imply in effect that aggressive spoilors may simply be those most vulnerable in the process of peace-contract making. A less powerful group, they point out, is much more reluctant than a more powerful group when it comes to striking a peace deal and sticking to it.⁷¹

Conclusion

The Brahimi Report can be seen in the context of recent UN thinking on human security. Humanitarian interventionism as part and parcel of collective human security still raises a number of difficult questions

associated with the UN's ability to make good on its promises to regions where its assistance is needed. The main theoretical challenge to the UN's grand idealist vision is to demonstrate not only that individual human beings matter more than states, but also that states are now losing control and becoming less relevant and less capable of performing their traditional task in providing security for their citizens. Unfortunately, evidence still invites caution. States are not about to be relegated to the dustbin of history, nor are they becoming much more willing or able to act against their own interests or at their expense. If states were indeed losing control and relevance, then the UN would face an even greater challenge: their questionable ability to take collective action. The trouble with the unwillingness and inability of developing countries to cooperate with one another is strongly correlated with their structural weaknesses perpetuating internal turbulence that often spreads beyond borders and destabilizes their regions. If states were fully incapacitated, the next question would be whether non-state actors could replace them in providing for security. The free-rider problem would pose an even greater challenge to collective action, especially in a world experiencing an increasing number of states, a proliferation of non-state actors, and growing sources of insecurity. Evidence has also shown that military intervention alone cannot effectively prevent massive political violence or promote human security.

We need to ask more serious questions: who exactly can provide for security and how can collective action be taken? We should never stop thinking about promoting human security collectively but will need to find a recipe more powerful than making countless policy recommendations for change and then conveniently saying that all depends on the political will of UN member states and that of parties to conflict.

NOTES

1. Roland Paris, 'Broadening the Study of Peace Operations', *International Studies Review*, Vol.2, No.3, fall 2000, pp.27 and 44.
2. The report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, UN Doc., A/54/839, 20 March 2000; the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc., A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 Aug. 2000; the UN Secretary-General's report on the implementation of the Panel's report, A/55/502, 20 Oct. 2000; the Special Committee's response to the Panel's report, UN Doc., A/C.4/55/6, 4 Dec. 2000.
3. This is a rejection of realism, which tends to see peace operations as mere reflections of major powers' strategic interests in international politics. John Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise of International Institutions', in Michael Brown et al. (eds), *Theories of War and Peace*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998; Joseph Grieco, *Cooperation Among Nations*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990; Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979.
4. Robert Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989.

5. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, 1992, p.9; for the 1995 version (n.44 below), see p.44.
6. *Ibid.*, p.9; for the 1995 version, see p.44.
7. *Ibid.*, p.8.
8. Edward Newman, 'Human Security and Constructivism', *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol.2, No.3, 2001, pp.239–51.
9. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, pp.6–7.
10. *Ibid.*, p.8.
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*, p.5.
13. *Ibid.*, p.47.
14. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, 2nd edn, New York: United Nations, 1995, pp.10, 11, 15, 20, 26, 27, 33, 34, 50.
15. *Ibid.*, p.12.
16. *Ibid.*, p.68.
17. *Ibid.*, p.28.
18. *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, UN Doc., A/55/305, S/2000/809, 17 Aug. 2000, p.viii. The Report is the byproduct of investigations by a panel of eminent personalities from around the world: Lakhdar Brahimi former Foreign Minister of Algeria as Chairman, J. Brian Atwood, Ambassador Colin Granderson, Dame Ann Hercus, Richard Monk, General Klaus Naumann, Hisako Shimura, Ambassador Vladimir Shustov, General Philip Sibanda, and Cornelio Sommaruga. The panel was convened on 7 March 2000, on the initiative of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.
19. I am thankful to Hisako Shimura, President of Tsuda College, Tokyo, and a member of the Brahimi Panel, for raising this point. Interview, 6 July 2001, Tokyo.
20. *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, p.45 *Italics original*.
21. *Ibid.*, pp.15–16, 17–28.
22. *Ibid.*, p.7.
23. *Ibid.*, p.9.
24. *Ibid.*, p.19.
25. *Ibid.*, p.12.
26. *Ibid.*, p.10.
27. *Ibid.*, p.9.
28. *Ibid.*, p.10.
29. *Ibid.*, p.9.
30. *Ibid.*
31. Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, 'The Promise of Collective Security', in Brown et al. (eds) (n.3 above), pp.397–406.
32. *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, p.9.
33. *Ibid.*
34. *Ibid.*
35. *Ibid.*, pp.29–34.
36. *Ibid.*, pp.34–41.
37. Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc., A/55/, 28 May 2001, p.2.
38. Even the arch-realist Kenneth Waltz now recognizes that '[m]ultipolarity is developing before our eyes'. K. Waltz, 'Structural Realism after the Cold War', *International Security*, Vol. 25, No.1, summer 2000, p.37
39. Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971.
40. It is worth recalling that the League of Nations' failure to prevent the Second World War from breaking out occurred at a time when the international system was multipolar.
41. Hisako Shimura raised some reservation about the Report because of her belief in multiculturalism. Interview, 6 July 2001.

42. David Held et al., *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999, p.81.
43. States' behaviour still seems to fit a realist account. See Laura Neack, 'UN Peacekeeping. In the interest of community or self?', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.32, No.2, May 1995, pp.181-96.
44. *Ibid.*, p.9.
45. *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, p.17.
46. *Ibid.*, p.9.
47. *Washington Post*, 29 April 1999; *The Japan Times*, 1 May 1999.
48. M.S. Rajan, 'The United Nations and the Security of Small States', *International Studies*, Vol.31, No.3, July-Sept. 1994, pp.287-304. The US, for instance, has little enthusiasm for involvement in domestic conflicts. Simon Duke, 'The United Nations and Intra-State Conflict', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.1, No.4, winter 1994, pp.375-98.
49. For more on this, see Michael Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*, New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997.
50. James Meernik, 'United States Military Intervention and the Promotion of Democracy', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.33, No.4, 1996, pp.391-402.
51. *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, p.18.
52. *Ibid.*, p.17.
53. *Ibid.*, p.18.
54. Alan J. Kuperman, *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001, p.viii.
55. Connie Peck, 'UN Preventive Action', in Muthiah Alagappa and Takashi Inoguchi (eds), *International Security Management and the United Nations*, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1999.
56. International Peace Academy and Center for International Cooperation, *Refashioning the Dialogue: Regional Perspectives on the Brahimi Report on UN Peace Operations*, pp.7-10, 13.
57. *Ibid.*, p.16.
58. Connie Peck, *The United Nations as a Dispute Settlement System: Improving Mechanisms for the Prevention and Resolution of Conflict*, The Hague, London and Boston: Kluwer Law International, p.25.
59. Cited in *ibid.*, p.36.
60. Robert Pape, 'Coercion and Military Strategy: Why Denial Works and Punishment Doesn't Work', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol.15, No.4, 1992, p.437.
61. *Ibid.*, pp.423-75.
62. *Ibid.*, p.464.
63. The extent to which the NATO actions in Kosovo can be considered a success remains debatable. See Michael Mandelbaum, 'A Perfect Failure', *Foreign Affairs*, Sept./Oct. 1999, pp.2-8; James B. Steinberg, 'A Perfect Polemic', *Foreign Affairs*, Nov./Dec. 1999, pp.128-133; Ivo Daalder and Michael Froman, 'Dayton's Incomplete Peace', *Foreign Affairs*, Nov./Dec. 1999, pp.106-13.
64. John M. Sanderson, 'Global Flux and the Dilemmas for United Nations Peacekeeping', *Strategic Analysis*, Vol.18, No.3, June 1995, pp.349-74. Shimura also acknowledges that the use of force was part of the problem in Somalia. Interview, 6 July 2001.
65. John G. Ruggie, *Constructing World Polity*, New York: Routledge, 1998, p.245.
66. Bruce Russett, 'Why Democratic Peace?', in *Debating the Democratic Peace*, pp.106, 92.
67. *Ibid.*, p.113.
68. *Ibid.*, pp.100-101.
69. David Lake and Donald Rothchild, 'Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict', in Michael Brown et al. (eds) (n.3 above), p.301.
70. See William V. O'Brien, 'The Rule of Law in Small States', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 541, Sept. 1995, pp.36-46.
71. Lake and Rothchild (n.69 above), p.301.