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Peace through Retribution or Reconciliation? Some Insights and Evidence from South-East Asia

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Introduction

Over the last two decades or so, liberal proponents of retributive justice (defined loosely as a form of judicial punishment through formal trials) in the West have been on the march under the globalist banner declaring a brave battle on behalf of those victimized by armed conflict and atrocity crime.¹ Only retribution, not reconciliation through compromise and mercy, helps end war and builds peace in post-conflict societies. But if peacebuilding has its limits,² we may need to ask why. I made a case against the principle of legal retribution in states where former mortal enemies are trapped in the insecurity dilemma.³ In recent years, South-East Asian leaders have also learned that retribution does not help end armed conflict or deter atrocity crime. Because of space constraints, this chapter relies on two country case studies – Cambodia and Timor-Leste – to help shed some light on this proposition. Some scholars provide critical perspectives on these cases, questioning whether the liberal peace is transferrable.⁴ This chapter contends that liberal peacebuilding has the potential to be more successful if the path of political reconciliation is taken more seriously.

Peace through retribution, and a critique

Peace is usually understood as the end of war (known as negative peace), but the concept has also been expanded to mean the absence of structural or indirect violence (positive peace). This broad concept of peace is similar to the newer concept of human security. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)⁵ published a report that defines human security as ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’. Individuals are secure when they enjoy peace and are free not only from armed conflict or physical violence but also from want or indirect/structural violence. The international community has the responsibility to protect those who are left unprotected when facing direct physical violence or the most serious crimes.⁶

Peacebuilding and the responsibility to protect

Liberal globalists regard armed conflict as a principal source of human insecurity, and advocate peacebuilding. In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), sponsored and hosted by Canada, published *The Responsibility to Protect*. One major contribution the ICISS made was to move away from general notions of humanitarian crises to armed conflicts, especially intrastate ones, and to establish thresholds for responsibility to protect (R2P) implementation. As the ICISS⁷ puts it, 'The most marked security phenomenon since the end of the Cold War has been the proliferation of armed conflict within states.' But armed conflict is not the only source of threat to human security. Mass atrocity crime is another. The ICISS, however, focuses on

large-scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or large-scale 'ethnic cleansing', actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.⁸

Security exists when armed conflict and direct physical violence end or when peace – both negative and positive – prevails. The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, however, highlights the four most serious crimes as a threat to people: war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing.

But how people are secured and peace is obtained depends on the effectiveness of policy instruments. Proponents of R2P support armed intervention, economic sanctions, retributive justice and democracy promotion, valuing them as effective peacebuilding tools. Peacebuilding is a dual process aimed at preventing armed conflict from recurring and promoting peace and security through justice, namely, working towards eliminating structural violence. Liberal international lawyers strongly believe that retributive justice, carried out by the international criminal courts and other international tribunals, is more effective and more cost-effective than other instruments.⁹

The globalist logics of peace through retribution

Liberal globalists are legalistic in their normative commitment to peacebuilding through retributive justice. Their proposition rests on a number of logics, such as those of emotions, appropriateness, other-help through collective action, and consequences. The logic of emotions rests on their moral conviction, driven by the shared feeling that we belong to the human race and must be outraged by human suffering. The logic of other-help (as opposed to mutual help or self-help) implies the idea of 'saving strangers'. Regarding the logic of appropriateness, they advocate the idea that stopping atrocity crime is the 'right thing'

to do. Members of the global community (states, non-state actors and international organizations) should thus take collective action to prosecute those who commit atrocity crime. The globalists thus reject the idea of amnesty for criminals or reconciliation, viewing these approaches as perpetuating the culture of impunity and violence.

The globalist logic of consequences is based on the assumption that retributive justice works, because potential human rights violators are rational actors.¹⁰ Proponents argue that the pursuit of retributive justice in post-conflict societies has positive effects when assessed in terms of its ability to terminate and de-escalate armed conflict, end mass atrocity crime, and deter such violence. Institutionally, retributive justice helps build and strengthen democracy, the rule of law and human rights. I discuss this literature elsewhere.¹¹

A critique of liberal globalist logics

This critique is not concerned with new regimes' criminal prosecutions of former regime officials.¹² The principal aim here is to assess the role of international criminal courts/tribunals and their effectiveness in countries long afflicted by war and repressive violence.

Political realists and critical scholars alike have warned against the globalist temptation to apply the liberal logics in the context of a *war-* or *conflict-prone* society. Critical scholars argue that transitional justice processes and mechanisms, including trials, are problematic or inappropriate. In conflict-prone societies, legal systems may not exist because of violent destruction or atrocities. The formal justice sector may not be part of their legal traditions, which may emphasize group or community identity or take other forms, such as reparations, exhumation, proper burial of victims, and rehabilitation or reintegration of perpetrators instead of individual accountability. As a result, such societies tend to favour traditional forms of justice. 'In such instances', as Chandra Sriram¹³ puts it, 'Western-style trials may not fit the political culture well.'

More importantly, this chapter questions the globalist logic of consequences by making the case that retributive justice, unless carefully pursued, may produce negative or detrimental effects on conflict-prone societies. Among the negative consequences of judicial intervention are included further chaos and even more atrocities, instead of more peace. Jack Goldsmith and Stephen Krasner,¹⁴ for instance, argue that criminal or retributive justice 'can prolong ... conflict, resulting in more deaths, destruction, and human suffering' and point out that 'a universal jurisdiction may cause more harm than the original crime it purports to address'. Also, according to Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri,¹⁵ prosecuting perpetrators of atrocities based on universal standards 'risks causing more atrocities than it would prevent, because it pays insufficient attention to political realities'. In their view, 'When a country's political institutions are weak, when forces of reform there have not won a decisive victory,

and when political spoilers are strong, attempts to put perpetrators of atrocities on trial are likely to increase the risk of violent conflict and further abuses.¹⁶ The global pursuit of retribution in institutionally fragile states or Hobbesian contexts may be ineffective because any threat of judicial punishment is likely to be hollow.

The hypothesis advanced here rests on this assumption: seeking to punish the 'bad guys' in certain *extreme* politico-security and institutional conditions would be, at best, ineffective and, at worst, counterproductive or even dangerous. Liberal globalists' rationalist assumptions tend to ignore a complex set of variables (such as institutional fragilities, power relations, poor socio-economic conditions, extreme insecurity and capacity to commit violence), all of which question the merits of retribution.

Methodologically, it is difficult to prove whether retributive justice works to advance peace in conflict-prone societies, because the above set of variables is not easily subject to empirical validation, especially when prosecution is not the only independent variable. Proponents of retributive justice run the risk of establishing a spurious relationship between prosecution and peace, especially when relying on a large number of cases and using quantitative methods. In-depth case studies may be more fruitful. South-East Asia provides such a case study: state leaders in this region seem to have learned that peace means the absence of armed conflict and violence, but they also tend to regard retributive justice as not the best policy instrument for conflict termination and peacebuilding. To illustrate this point, this chapter relies on Cambodia and Timor-Leste. They are not perfectly identical cases, but are comparable in some key aspects: they are former European colonies, previously torn by armed conflict and atrocity crime, and are still prone to violence. Retributive justice has also been pursued in these countries, whose leaders have resisted the politics of retribution and pursued reconciliation.

Peace in Cambodia: Not through retributive justice

The global pursuit of retributive justice in Cambodia arose out of the concern about the culture of impunity deeply rooted in repressive violence, committed especially under the Khmer Rouge regime. This case shows that the politics of retribution is problematic.

Armed conflict and violence

The Khmer Rouge reign of terror marks one of the most ruthless periods in human history, and was definitely a serious threat to regional peace. The 'killing fields' (following the Khmer Rouge's military victory in 1975 and lasting until the end of 1978) is a case of mass atrocity. For all scholars, the Khmer Rouge regime led by Prime Minister Pol Pot committed murder against civilian populations. For some scholars, however, especially those in the West, the mass

atrocities committed under the Pol Pot regime were associated with its racist ideology and its lust for power.¹⁷ Whether the killing fields represent a case of genocide remains debatable, but the regime undoubtedly committed heinous war crimes and crimes against humanity. The murderous regime also engaged in a border war against Vietnam and caused the latter to invade Cambodia late in 1978. The Vietnamese invasion ended the Khmer Rouge reign of terror but the war continued after Vietnam withdrew its troops in 1989 and did not end until 1998, but the Khmer Rouge movement disintegrated.¹⁸

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Efforts to establish an international criminal tribunal formally began in June 1997, when the Cambodian government requested the United Nations (UN) to proceed in a joint effort to hold Khmer Rouge leaders accountable for their past crimes and to bring them to justice. It was not until 2003 that both sides finally agreed on the need to establish the Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia (ECCC), a hybrid judicial body made up of Cambodian and international judges and prosecutors. Only Khmer Rouge leaders 'most responsible' for the crimes committed from 1975 to the end of 1978, however, would be subject to justice. The ECCC was inaugurated in July 2006.

Some progress has since been made. In June 2007, the Court began its formal proceedings. Kaing Guek Eav (better known as Duch), the chief executioner at the infamous Toul Sleng extermination centre, was the first to face justice: charged with war crimes, crimes against humanity, torture and premeditated murder, he was put on trial and accepted his personal responsibility for the torture and death of approximately 15,000 people. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. In December 2009, the ECCC issued for the first time additional genocide charges against Khieu Samphan (the Khmer Rouge's former head of state), Nuon Chea (78 years old, known as Brother Number Two, second only to Pol Pot) and Ieng Sary (former Khmer Rouge minister of foreign affairs). By August 2014, after eight years and at a cost of more than \$200 million, three Khmer Rouge leaders had been sentenced to life imprisonment (Kaing Guek Eav for crimes against humanity and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949; Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea for their crimes against humanity). The punishment definitely more than fitted the most serious crimes the regime under their leadership committed, but it is unclear whether the trials have helped to end the armed conflict and build peace.

Peace through retributive justice?

On the surface, the pursuit of retributive justice looks as though it helped to end the war. In June 1997, the two co-prime ministers had submitted a joint request to the UN for assistance (in their effort to bring Khmer Rouge leaders to justice). But their joint effort did not result in peace either. In July 1997, Hun Sen staged a violent coup that led to the overthrow of Prince Ranariddh, and an armed conflict between the two parties broke out. Although the warring parties agreed

to participate in a parliamentary election in 1998, the new peace process did not result from any pursuit of retributive justice. Moreover, peace resulted from the disintegration of the Khmer Rouge's armed rebellion, especially after Pol Pot's death in April 1998. One reason for these positive developments was that the government used an effective strategy to divide the Khmer Rouge leadership by granting an amnesty to Ieng Sary. The Khmer Rouge leadership's infighting then intensified and led to the arrest of Pol Pot by his 'defence minister' Ta Mok (who then put him on show 'trial') and his death.

Another problem with global legalism lies in the questionable assumption that the Khmer Rouge trials are likely to have specific and general deterrent effects on armed conflict and repressive violence. The Khmer Rouge leaders were unlikely to commit any of the crimes they committed from 1975 to 1978. Their armed movement had disintegrated, and they were too weak to fight their way back to power and commit more crimes. They were advanced in age and enjoyed no external support. The atrocities they committed from 1975 to 1978 also resulted from multiple factors that no longer exist, including their radical ideology (based on a Maoism that glorifies violence), severe institutional breakdowns and the policy of self-isolation that allowed the regime to commit atrocities at will.¹⁹ The regime in Phnom Penh is unlikely to commit mass atrocities either, for various reasons. Hun Sen is not an ideologue or a radical leader. Cambodia has, since the early 1990s, been a member of international organizations and has maintained generally positive relations with its neighbours. The international community has been supportive of the Cambodian regime. Between 1998 and 2013, the total amount of international aid Cambodia received amounted to more than US\$10 billion. Most importantly, the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) has become far more institutionalized than any other party.

The argument that retributive justice has made Cambodia more democratic and respectful of human rights also receives little empirical support. The work of the ECCC has not met the high expectations of its advocates. The country has now become more authoritarian. Soon after the government had requested the UN for advice on how to pursue legal action against Khmer Rouge leaders, Hun Sen not only staged a coup against his co-premier but also consolidated power at the expense of democracy. Cambodia has since drifted towards a hegemonic-party system. The parliamentary election results between 1998 and 2008 allowed the CPP to win more and more seats in the National Assembly. The CPP lost a lot of seats in the 2013 parliamentary election, but then stepped up its efforts to maintain power. Violence was used to crack down on the opposition. Members of the CPP, especially powerful allies of Hun Sen, have controlled the Senate. The CPP has maintained a monopoly of power over the communes across the country, and has also dominated the armed forces and the court system. Under the perceived threat of retribution, the CPP leadership

is unlikely to give up power for democracy. Meanwhile, the government has sought to close the UN Human Rights Office in Cambodia and has made it difficult for human rights workers to do their work. The human rights situation has not really improved, as was evident after the 2013 elections. If the human rights situation has not returned to where it used to be, it is far from clear that the ECCC *per se* is what has deterred further violence. Other independent or interdependent variables such as political stability, economic growth, international support for democratic institution building and regional engagement (instead of radicalism and national isolation or autarky) have mitigated security politics in Cambodia.

Resistance to retributive justice

Cambodian leaders have viewed international intervention in a positive light, but they have also resisted the idea of retributive justice. Hun Sen repeatedly rejected any idea of bringing more Khmer Rouge officials (in addition to the few already in custody) to justice, seeing this move as having the potential to give rise to civil war.²⁰ In October 2010, he also told the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon that he would not allow the ECCC to try other former Khmer Rouge officials not in custody, reiterating his concern that such an effort would plunge the country back into civil war.²¹

Hun Sen's position may have been self-serving (since he is a former Khmer Rouge commander), but it is reasonable to conclude that he understood the security dynamics of Cambodian politics better than those who would not have to bear the direct consequences of retributive politics. There is also no reason to believe that Hun Sen did not want to see all of his former enemies punished (although in the early 1980s, his regime tried Khmer Rouge leaders *in absentia*; in 1997, his government requested the UN to help bring them to justice), but he subsequently became a 'pragmatist realist' who understood the limits of retribution in a country prone to violent conflict. And he was not the only one who resisted retribution. Early in November 2010, for instance, Foreign Minister Hor Namhong told US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (during her first visit to Cambodia) that an aggressive move to bring more Khmer Rouge members to justice would jeopardize peace and stability.²² If more legal action is taken to get the International Criminal Court to prosecute Hun Sen,²³ resistance to retributive justice is thus likely to become stronger. The concerns expressed by Cambodian leaders were not new, however. As an academic, I critiqued the politics of retribution in institutionally weak states, particularly Cambodia.²⁴

The degree to which Cambodia's judicial and legal system has been strengthened as the result of this judicial intervention remains to be seen, but there is no strong evidence suggesting that the country's judicial and legal institutions have become less politicized, or that the Hun Sen regime has become more reluctant to crack down on challenges to its power.

Peace in Timor-Leste: Not through retributive justice either

Timor-Leste (formerly East Timor) has become more peaceful in recent years, but this positive development cannot be explained in terms of liberal globalist logic alone. Nor can post-independence violent conflict be explained by lack of retributive justice.

Armed conflict, violence and formal justice

The Portuguese colonized East Timor in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the territory did not gain independence until Portugal abandoned its colonial rule early in 1975. The Indonesian military invaded the territory later that year, annexed it and committed atrocities. Armed conflict and crime against East Timorese did not end when Indonesian President B. J. Habibie reversed the hardline policy of his predecessor, President Suharto, announcing in January 1999 that his government would let the East Timorese determine their political future in a referendum. During the summer of 1999, Indonesian soldiers and militias drove between 400,000 and 600,000 villagers out of their homes. Threats to the security of Timorese people did not end after 98.5 per cent of those who cast their votes on 30 August 1999 favoured independence. Early in the following month, Indonesian forces and pro-Indonesia militia fighters waged a violent campaign, killing more than 1,000 civilians, driving more than 250,000 others into Indonesia's West Timor, and destroying up to 70 per cent of buildings and roads in East Timor.

International efforts were then made to bring justice to the people of East Timor. In 2000, a new set of justice mechanisms – comprising the Special Panels for Serious Crimes (SPSC) within the District Court of Dili and in the Court of Appeal, the Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) and the Defense Lawyer Unit – was established by the United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET). The purpose of the Serious Crimes Process was to investigate and prosecute those who had committed crimes between 1 January and 25 October 1999. UNTAET was entrusted by the UN Security Council with the authority 'to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice'. In 2001, UNTAET also created a Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation (CAVR), whose task was to investigate human rights violations committed between April 1974 and 25 October 1999. The Commission worked to facilitate reconciliation with justice involving those who had committed less serious offences, but it was not able to grant any amnesty. Its final report provides evidence of systematic human rights violations under Indonesian rule, which contributed to the deaths of between 100,000 and 180,000 East Timorese. Another *ad hoc* court, the Human Rights Court on East Timor, was also created in 2000 by the Indonesian government to ensure that military and civilian leaders would be held accountable for human rights violations.

The limits and dangers of retribution

The hybrid tribunal accomplished little and made no significant impact on peace in Timor-Leste. Justice has been denied (Human Rights Watch, 2002).²⁵ The SPSC functioned poorly. According to Sergey Vasiliev,²⁶ 'the SPSC was at all times an "orphan" in the family of international criminal courts'. By the time the Serious Crimes process ended in May 2005, the SCU had indicted 392 individuals in 95 indictments. Among the indictees were General Wiranto, Indonesia's former minister of defence and commander of the armed forces. According to Elizabeth Stanley,²⁷ however, only crimes that occurred in 1999 were targeted, and most of those who were convicted were small fish Timorese rather than high-ranking members of the Indonesian military.

Legal globalists could argue that the lack of justice contributed to armed clashes and other forms of violence after independence. Armed attacks by pro-Indonesia militia broke out again in 2003, when half a dozen small groups of men from West Timor with extensive military training attempted to infiltrate East Timor, where they also killed villagers. In 2006, Timor-Leste fell back into violence, when riots and armed clashes in Dili threatening civil war erupted in April and May. A series of violent episodes left ten unarmed police officers and 25 people dead, and displaced 150,000 residents in Dili.

While it sounds persuasive on the surface, the liberal argument has difficulty establishing a positive relationship between retributive justice and peace from 2007 to 2014, when the security situation improved amidst political rivalry: there have been no reports on serious violent incidents (similar to those in 2003, 2004 and 2006).

Evidence shows that the violence from 2003 to 2006 had little to do with the lack of retributive justice, and this form of justice may even have yielded negative results. The 2006 rioting and armed clashes resulted from the firing of 600 Timor-Leste Defence Force (F-FDTL) troops, frustration over rampant corruption and high levels of unemployment, not from the actions of those who had committed crimes up until the end of 1999. Socio-economic conditions remained poor, and the international community as well as the government of Timor-Leste failed to meet the welfare requirements of the East Timorese (Richmond and Franks, 2008, pp. 196–197).²⁸ In 2002, between 85 and 90 per cent of urban adults were unemployed. In the late 2000s, the unemployment rate remained around 50 per cent. In 2006, about 40 per cent of the population lived under the poverty line.²⁹

A more rigorous pursuit of retribution would have exacerbated tensions. Just months after the 2005 CAVR report was released, for instance, the country slid back into anarchy, driven by a series of incidents that led to widespread rioting and armed clashes in 2006. Tension resumed in October 2006, when the UN published the report of its Special Commission of Inquiry for East Timor, which blamed Prime Minister Alkatiri for the violent uprising and for his government's

failure to prevent the transfer of weapons to civilians, implicated the former interior and defence ministers, and called for prosecution of those responsible for activities leading to the 2006 uprising.

Today, there are still thousands of Timorese refugees living in the Indonesian province of West Timor, where they fled from the 1999 violence. They did not return to East Timor for various security concerns, including the status of former militia members who did not want to face justice.³⁰ According to Freedom House,³¹ 'The status and reintegration of the thousands of Timorese refugees living in the Indonesian province of West Timor... remained unresolved in 2013.'

Explaining peace after 2006

If it does not explain the violent incidents of 2003, 2004 and 2006, the lack of retributive justice also cannot explain why there has been no such violence since then. Timorese leaders believe that relative peace through democracy building results from reconciliation. Their wisdom in resisting retributive justice can be partly found in the enduring influence of customary belief systems and dispute resolution practices within their society.³²

The two best-known political leaders in the country – Jose Ramos Horta and Xanana Gusmão – have been in line with the political approach to the rule of law. After 2006, they put most emphasis on reconciliation rather than justice and accountability. They regarded reconciliation as yielding more positive results than punitive justice, and did not see reconciliation as antithetical to the notion of political democracy.³³

This does not suggest that Timorese leaders disliked retribution, but that they (like Hun Sen) were also pragmatists who understood the limits of retribution. In March 2005, the leaders of Timor-Leste and Indonesia took their cue from Jose Ramos Horta by creating the Commission of Truth and Friendship, whose aim was only to investigate past crimes – not to prosecute the perpetrators – and to recommend amnesties for perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity. According to Megan Hirst, there was 'too much friendship, too little truth', as the Timorese leadership 'prioritized good relations with its neighbor Indonesia over the pursuit of justice'.³⁴ When Amnesty International called on the UN Security Council in August 2009 to establish an independent criminal tribunal, Timor-Leste and Indonesia rejected the idea. However, the two states are at peace with each other, and they have even become more democratic than Cambodia, where top Khmer Rouge leaders have been tried and punished.³⁵

Conclusion

Liberal globalists make a case for retributive justice, and some go so far as to demonize alternative methods of peacebuilding, thus leaving no room for any

doubt about the effectiveness of their legalistic approach. This chapter, however, shows that South-East Asians in general, and politicians in Cambodia and Timor-Leste in particular, faced the same liberal temptation when seeking to build peace: they tended to see retributive justice as one of the most potent panaceas for war and violence. But, once in leadership positions, they have ended up resisting this liberal strategy for peacebuilding. They have learned from experience that the road to peace rests on the wisdom of political reconciliation through compromise and the liberal idea of democracy.

Although it is difficult to prove that democracy through reconciliation yields better results than retributive justice, enough evidence suggests that retribution proves to be an ineffectual or even a dangerous tool when executed in conflict-prone societies where formal institutions are extremely weak, and former foes distrust each other and have the ability to inflict harm on each other. Cambodia and Timor-Leste clearly show that democracy through elite reconciliation and compromise appears to have positive effects: the trials of Khmer Rouge leaders have not made Cambodia more democratic, whereas the absence of such high-level trials has not prevented Timor-Leste and Indonesia from being more democratic than Cambodia. This does not mean that retributive justice should be abandoned, or that formal justice institutions should not be built. The point is that retribution is possible, and may have a positive impact on the state and society when perpetrators are first defeated and disarmed. Still, retributive justice should be pursued judiciously, especially when the threat of judicial punishment from toothless international organizations not only lacks credibility but also reinforces perpetrators' desire to hold on to power at all costs and puts peace in jeopardy.

The pursuit of retribution before institutionalization³⁶ may also prevent the latter from advancing, especially when perpetrators can still do much to thwart institution building. If pursued simultaneously, retribution and reconciliation may even produce undesirable outcomes, largely because neither victims nor perpetrators are likely to get what they want. When faced with the prospect of judicial punishment, perpetrators are likely to show no remorse, and are unlikely to admit guilt or give up power voluntarily, or may be unwilling to pay their victims any compensation. As a result, the victims are unlikely to reduce their retributive appetites, but are forced to live with their painful past. In the case of the Czech Republic,³⁷ perpetrators were the target of justice, but they showed no remorse and held on to higher socio-economic positions.

Thus, liberal peacebuilding in conflict-prone states or societies is a process with great potential, but surrounded by danger. When it becomes the only lens through which we see the world and the only way we seek solutions for problems, the appetite for justice through retribution often leads insecure people – including ourselves – to do foolish things. What the US has done in Afghanistan and Iraq after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 helps illustrate the point.³⁸ There

is no future for our world without compromise, forgiveness³⁹ and effective institution-building efforts, which also depend on prosperity and sustainable socio-economic development.

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Notes

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QUERIES TO BE ANSWERED BY AUTHOR (SEE MARGINAL MARKS)

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Chapter 25

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AQ1	340	Check if the correction made is correct.