

# Collaborative Human Security? The UN and Other Actors in Cambodia

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Based on post-Cold War development in the security field and a case study of Cambodia, this study contends that the UN system moves towards ‘collaborative human security’ and away from state-centric, military security. The UN has played a growing role in promoting the personal security of individuals, although its impact varies: peacekeeping and the pursuit of international criminal justice as methods for achieving human security appear to be less successful than the political and economic approaches. But more can be done to ensure greater effectiveness of these methods.

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This essay seeks to advance the concept of collaborative human security with reference to Asia. Collaborative human security is defined here as something done for a common purpose by different actors, aiming to promote the security interests of *other* individuals or to meet their security needs. The concept differs from that of liberalism, which tends to define cooperation as ‘collaboration for *mutual* advantage’.<sup>1</sup>

The concept of ‘human security’ has come under criticism from scholars of various theoretical persuasions.<sup>2</sup> According to Roland Paris, for instance, it ‘does not appear to offer a particularly useful framework of analysis for scholars or policymakers’.<sup>3</sup> It is extremely difficult for academics to see the concept in an operational light, or for policy-makers to prioritize policy agendas. The critique notes that scholars find it difficult to identify human security actors, driven as they are by a variety of interests and diverse objectives. Because specific measures cannot be analytically isolated, scholars do not know where to concentrate their research efforts. Nevertheless, drawing on insights from the peace studies tradition, particularly neo-Kantian internationalism, the concept can provide a useful framework for analysis if we can answer the following questions: ‘what is being secured and against what?’, ‘what methods are used to achieve human security, and who provides it?’. The first question is certainly easier to answer than the others. It is clear that the referent is not the state, but rather societies, groups and individuals. The

second question is more difficult; sources of threat to human security are numerous, from political repression and violations of human rights to hunger, disease, illicit drugs and organized crime. This essay defines human security as freedom from the fear of violent death, political subjugation and want. The essay also seeks to identify human security actors, by examining what the UN, in collaboration with other external actors, sought to achieve in Cambodia. It then assesses the methods used collectively to achieve human security objectives. The appropriate analytical concept is therefore 'collaborative human security', since human security is the responsibility of a number of actors: state, interstate and non-state. It may be difficult to assess the collaborative role of human security actors, but it is not impossible to determine whether their activities have made an impact.

In answering the question: 'to what extent have the UN and other actors contributed to the promotion of human security needs in Cambodia?', this study examines collaboration among donors involved in both peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Approximately 15,000 UN peacekeepers were sent to Cambodia to monitor the ceasefire, disarmament and demobilization agreed by the country's armed factions. Peacebuilding involved the pursuit of criminal justice against surviving Khmer Rouge leaders, international assistance to promote free and fair elections as well as human rights (with the aim of building liberal democracy) and economic reconstruction. The case study indicates that the UN has played a growing role in promoting the personal security of individuals, although its impact varies from method to method. The pursuit of international criminal justice and international peacekeeping especially disarmament as methods for achieving human security appear to be less successful than the political and economic approaches. But the overall success of even the last two methods remained far from ideal.

### **Collaborative Human Security: A Conceptual Framework**

Collaborative human security differs from collective defence and collective security because the referent object for human security is not the state. In collective defence, military security is defined in national terms; the state is the referent object for security and is to be protected by military means.<sup>4</sup> In collective security (inspired by Immanuel Kant's idea that the majority of states act collectively to punish any state that committed an act of aggression), the state remains the referent object for security.<sup>5</sup> In human security studies, however, the individual is the main referent object for security. Because of its ontological emphasis on the human level, human security as the key concept is indebted to

several theoretical traditions, which are non-state-centric and humanistic in orientation.<sup>6</sup> The concept of collaborative human security also differs from both collective defence and collective security, because it broadens the focus of political realism on war, in which 'security studies is defined as the study of the threat, use, and control of military force'.<sup>7</sup> In collective defence, states are driven by the fear of military defeat, foreign conquest and subjugation. Collective security is still based on the same kind of fear: states within the international community still live in fear of military defeat, foreign conquest and subjugation, since some are still expected to violate the norm of world peace, even though most states have already renounced wars of conquest.

Collaborative human security still relies on the logic of fear, but turns analytical attention away from military conquest or aggression as the ultimate form of threat by locating sources of threat to security across and within the national boundaries. Proponents of human security do not argue that military sources of threat are not important at all. But they seek to broaden the focus to include the fear of violent death, political subjugation and want. The fear of violent death and political subjugation includes the slaughter of civilians, civil conflict and state-sanctioned aggression.<sup>8</sup> Individuals are free when they are not subject to the politico-military control of other states or dictatorship as well as various other sources of threat to their personal survival and rights. From a classical liberal perspective, political and civil rights are most fundamental to human freedom/security. 'Freedom from the fear' of want is more of a socio-economic nature and has its intellectual roots in liberalism and includes the fears of poverty, unemployment, hunger, crime and environmental degradation.

Proponents of human security thus define fear in humanistic, rather than statist, terms and seek to reduce such fear by promoting freedom for human beings, not the freedom of sovereign states from military aggression, defeat and subjugation. Although the human security indicators are difficult to measure, freedom from living below a poverty line should serve as a key pointer for assessing the degree to which the fear of want (including survivable levels of per capita income, equitable access to health care and sufficient food consumption) was effectively reduced. Life expectancy in non-violent situations, however, should be the overall measure of fear reduction.

The methods for achieving human security also differ from those advocated by realists. Proponents of human security see military means to achieve national security as often working against human security. As the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty put it, the traditional narrow conception of security 'diverts enormous

amounts of national wealth and human resources into armaments and armed forces'. Meanwhile, 'countries fail to protect their citizens from chronic insecurities of hunger, disease, inadequate shelter, crime, unemployment, social conflict and environmental hazard'.<sup>9</sup>

This does not mean that proponents of human security reject all military means. Two military methods for promoting human security are humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping.<sup>10</sup> Humanitarian intervention has a cosmopolitan emphasis on the need to end widespread starvation (Somalia in 1992), to restore democracy (Haiti in 1994), to end civil war (Bosnia in 1995) or to stop 'ethnic cleansing' (Kosovo in 1999).<sup>11</sup> Traditionally, it has been treated as the international community's 'right to intervene' in situations where human beings suffer from violent conflict, civil disorder and repression. The International Commission on Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty redefines the concept by introducing the term 'the responsibility to protect'. The international community has the responsibility to intervene in violent situations, where there is either 'large-scale loss of life' or 'ethnic cleansing'. Intra-state UN peacekeeping can also promote human security in helping to control and resolve conflicts between hostile domestic parties.<sup>12</sup> Peacebuilding promotes human security through specific methods designed to prevent conflict from recurring. According to John Cockell, it 'is a sustained process of preventing internal threats to human security from causing protracted, violent conflict'.<sup>13</sup> There are at least three methods: legal, political and economic. The first emphasizes justice issues; for instance, efforts have been made to build an international criminal justice system, viewed as a way to build peace through justice.<sup>14</sup> The second is of a political nature, primarily because of its emphasis on democratic institution building to promote liberal democracy based on free and fair elections and human rights.<sup>15</sup> The third relies on socio-economic development.<sup>16</sup> Together these methods provide the basis for market democracy building aimed at promoting freedom from the fear of violent death, subjugation and want.

Regarding the question of who provides security, realist perspectives contend that it is the state that provides for its citizens. Clearly, however, states may not always protect their citizens, and some may even use violence against them. But the real problem is not states as such, but rather types of states. In Barry Buzan's view, only 'strong states', defined in terms of internal stability and cohesion, are capable of providing their citizens with the security they need.<sup>17</sup> It should be stressed that proponents of human security do not argue that states are unimportant. States thus have the primary responsibility to protect their own citizens and to promote human security in partnership with other actors,<sup>18</sup> but

they add that when states fail to protect their own people, outside actors must step in. Proponents of human security thus recognize the contribution of international organizations, such as the UN and its specialized agencies,<sup>19</sup> regional organizations, and other non-state actors. For example, in peacebuilding, non-state actors include NGOs, business, media, scientific, professional and educational communities. Those that have their foundations within the new social movements 'represent values and aspirations associated with peoples rather than with states', including non-violent conflict resolution, the promotion of human rights, sustainable development, and social and economic justice.<sup>20</sup> Furthermore, collaborative human security seeks to balance state aggression against people through a system of checks and balances and the preponderant power of the international community, whereby actors go beyond their own self-interest or even mutual interest to act in the best interest of others. Collaboration depends on their ideological consensus on humanistic values, the presence of their shared commitment to human security, and action taken for a common purpose.

In sum, collaborative human security is a normative and empirical commitment to scholarship and humanity based on the understanding that the individual, not the state, is the main unit of analysis, that security means freedom from the fear of violent death, political subjugation and want (not simply the fear of foreign aggression or military defeat or subjugation), and that state, interstate and non-state actors are capable of taking collaborative action to promote this type of security. The following sections assess the impact of actors collaborating to promote human security in Cambodia.

### **Cambodia: Who Provides Security and How?**

Cambodia provides a suitable case for testing the concept of collaborative human security. The country has a long history of armed conflict, political repression and poverty. Following the end of the Khmer Empire in 1431, it became subject to invasion and domination by several foreign powers, including Thailand, Vietnam, Spain (late sixteenth century) and France (1863–1953).<sup>21</sup> From the time it gained its independence in 1953 to the end of the 1960s, it was under Prince Norodom Sihanouk's paternalistic authoritarian rule. During 1970–78, Cambodians under the Khmer Republican and the Khmer Rouge regimes suffered from internal repression and crimes against humanity. The sources of threat to personal security were numerous. Physical violence during the civil war from 1970 to 1974 resulted in deaths estimated at somewhere between 600,000 and 800,000. Many thousands of ethnic Vietnamese

were massacred and some 120,000 Vietnamese fled in fear to Vietnam. About two million Cambodians became internally displaced refugees, seeking refuge in the cities because of the war and bombing. Under the Khmer Rouge regime, between one and three million Cambodians are said to have died from brutality by Khmer Rouge soldiers and cadres, starvation, forced labour and lack of medical care.<sup>22</sup> In 1978, Vietnam invaded and established a tight grip of socialist authoritarian rule.<sup>23</sup> The situation improved in the 1980s, but was nowhere near to a decent degree of human security. Many Cambodians still fell victim to landmines, which killed between 200 and 300 per month. In the early 1990s, Cambodia was estimated to have between 22,000 and 30,000 amputees. Throughout the 1980s, its people were still dying in the ongoing civil war, deprived of their political rights and civil liberties.<sup>24</sup> Freedom from fear of want was also limited. Basic human needs were not met. The high rates of morbidity and mortality were caused partly by an uncertain food supply. Hunger and malnutrition were common. Life expectancy improved only slightly, to about 49 years during 1982–93.<sup>25</sup>

Only in the early 1990s was Cambodia brought into the global fold of post-Cold War states making democratic transitions when four warring factions – the State of Cambodia (SOC), the Khmer Rouge (officially known as Democratic Kampuchea or DK), the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), and the royalist party known as FUNCINPEC – signed the Paris Agreements on 23 October 1991 and agreed to turn their battlefield into a ballot box.<sup>26</sup> From analysis of the objectives of the agreements, it becomes clear that the signatories sought not only to defend the sovereignty of Cambodia as a state within the UN system, but also to promote the personal security of its people. The agreements did not negate the principle of state sovereignty, but in addition referred to 'people' as sovereign. The concept of popular sovereignty was thus fundamental to the agreements, which reaffirmed 'the inalienable rights of States freely to determine their own political, economic, cultural and social systems in accordance with *the will of their peoples*, without outside interference, subversion, coercion or threat'.<sup>27</sup>

### *Role of the UN*

At the factions' invitation, the UN intervened with two general approaches to human security in Cambodia: peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The peacekeeping force of 22,000 peacekeepers in 270 locations around the country played a crucial role in ensuring national and human security by way of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed forces. Annex 1 of the Paris Agreements stated that the UN Tran-

sitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) would 'supervise the regrouping and relocating of all forces to specifically designated cantonment areas', would then 'initiate the process of arms control and reduction', and would 'take necessary steps regarding the phased process of demobilization of the military forces of the parties'. UNTAC would also assist 'with clearing mines' and undertake 'training programmes in mine clearance and a mine awareness programme among the Cambodian people'.<sup>28</sup>

The second approach was peacebuilding. The UN also pressed Cambodia to set up an international tribunal to try Khmer Rouge leaders for crimes against humanity. The agreements did not mention this because the Khmer Rouge was a signatory, it was impossible for them to include provisions other than those aimed at promoting democratic and human rights and preventing their violations. But in August 1998, long after UNTAC's departure in 1993, the UN appointed a Commission of Experts to examine the issue and in March 1999 a small legal team recommended that 20–30 Khmer Rouge leaders be brought to trial. Efforts by the UN faced stiff challenges. In February 2002, the UN Secretary-General ended negotiations with the Cambodian government, having failed to gain genuine support from the latter for the establishment of a court that would meet international standards of independence, impartiality and objectivity. The Hun Sen government resisted this, but in May 2003 the UN General Assembly finally adopted a resolution approving an agreement between the two sides to establish Extraordinary Chambers to try Khmer Rouge leaders.

Another component of peacebuilding was to promote democracy and human rights. Part II, Article 12, of the agreements stated: 'The Cambodian people shall have the right to determine their own political future through the free and fair election of a constituent assembly, which will draft and approve a new Cambodian Constitution'.<sup>29</sup>

For the 1993 election, UNTAC established 1,400 polling sites across the country and recruited and trained 48,000 Cambodian election workers, as well as 1,000 international supervising officers. Approximately 90 per cent of the estimated eligible voters were registered. During the 1998 general election the UN was further tasked with coordinating the Joint International Observers Group (consisting of 500 observers from 40 countries).

Part III of the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict was devoted to human rights, including those of refugees and displaced persons.<sup>30</sup> Cambodia and UNTAC shared the responsibility of ensuring that human rights would be respected. For its part, Cambodia agreed 'to ensure respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms' and agreed 'to take effective measures

to ensure that the policies and practices of the past shall never be allowed to return' and 'to adhere to relevant international human rights instruments'.<sup>31</sup> UNTAC's Human Rights Component had the responsibility to foster the 'development and implementation of a programme of human rights education to promote respect for and understanding of human rights', 'to investigate human rights complaints', and, where appropriate, to take 'corrective action' (Annex 1, Section E). After UNTAC's departure, the UN established a branch of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to monitor and promote respect for human rights in Cambodia, in line with the agreement, which required international monitoring and an annual report to the UN.<sup>32</sup> This was a unique development in that it was the first branch to be established outside the UNHCHR office in Geneva.

A third component, based on Part IV of the agreements, was the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Cambodia and its economic development, even prohibiting any attempt to impose a development strategy on the country from any outside source or to deter potential donors from contributing to its reconstruction. Cambodia would have the primary responsibility for deciding its own needs, and aid and reconstruction was not to omit any area of the country or any level of society, especially the more disadvantaged.

In the 1990s, numerous actors actively involved in the collaborative project to promote human security included states, international/regional organizations and foreign NGOs. There were 18 foreign state signatories of the Paris Agreements, and UNTAC was a multinational operation whose peacekeepers came from 34 countries. Between 1992 and 2001, there were 18 major bilateral donors,<sup>33</sup> and several other multilateral ones, including UN agencies, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the European Union (EU). The NGO community has also been a major aid source. As recently as June 2002, foreign donors from 22 countries and seven international organizations attended the annual pledging conference. Between 1992 and 2001, the donor community had disbursed more than \$4 billion.<sup>34</sup> In addition, other types of assistance included freestanding technical cooperation, investment-related technical cooperation, investment project assistance, budgetary aid and balance-of-payments support, and food aid/emergency relief assistance.<sup>35</sup> Thus, over the 1992–2004 period, international assistance covered a wide range of human security activities associated with peacekeeping and peacebuilding (namely, international criminal justice, the promotion of electoral democracy and human rights, as well as economic reconstruction), with the external actors generally sharing a set of liberal norms pro-



moting human security. But the question is whether they were successful in doing so, and effective in their collaborative action.

### **A Critical Evaluation of Collaborative Action on Human Security**

The extent to which the conditions for human security improved in over the 1992–2002 period is difficult to measure in any precise fashion, but evidence shows that Cambodians have now enjoyed a higher degree of freedom from fear when compared with the 1980s. Without the UN intervention that led to the election in 1993, the Cambodian factions would have not signed the Paris Agreements and the country would not have seen its first multi-party election since the early 1970s. Neither of the two former socialist allies in the region – Laos and Vietnam – has experienced such international intervention, and neither has to this day moved in the direction of liberal democracy.

Collaborative efforts made by the UN and other actors to bring violators of human rights to justice enjoyed the least success. The legislation establishing the Extraordinary Chambers came into effect in August 2001, and the Cambodian government subsequently made efforts to accommodate UN demands. Overall, however, the arrangements were flawed. The Extraordinary Chambers could even be judged as a major setback for international criminal justice. The Chambers have limited international character since they are ‘national courts’ established by Cambodian law, operating within the country’s existing judicial system and dominated by Cambodian judges. The Trial Chamber has three Cambodian and two international judges, the Appeals Chamber four Cambodians and three international judges, and the Supreme Court five Cambodian and four international judges. The decisions on guilt and innocence could be made on a ‘supermajority rule’ based on the consent of at least one international judge, but the international judges could have no supremacy over their Cambodian counterparts. According to the Asia Division of Human Rights Watch:

On cases that don’t have any political implications, Cambodian judges can operate with independence. . . whenever there were significant cases in which the government was interested, the judges told us very clearly that they were given orders by the Cambodian government how to decide cases, that they could not refuse those orders for fear of their own safety.<sup>36</sup>

Moreover, the UN is planning to spend around \$60 million to prosecute a handful of ageing Khmer Rouge leaders, only two of whom have been arrested and detained. Human Rights Watch criticized and urged the

UN General Assembly and its Third Committee not to approve the draft agreement that would prosecute 'senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible'.<sup>37</sup> But peace in Cambodia resulted from the Khmer Rouge's disintegration and integration into national politics after a series of amnesties, not from the pursuit of international criminal justice.<sup>38</sup> The literature tends to support this point: the judicial method is viewed as expensive, time-consuming, driven by great powers' geo-strategic interests,<sup>39</sup> ineffective,<sup>40</sup> and even counterproductive.<sup>41</sup>

The UN efforts to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate the factional armed forces and to reform the armed and security forces met with more success, but still faced limitations. UNTAC's Mine Clearing Training Unit, for instance, began to train Cambodians in de-mining and the task was taken over by the Cambodian Mine Action Centre in June 1992. This operation made some progress: the reported number of deaths and injuries fell to 1,019 in 1999 from 1,715 in 1998 and 3,050 in 1996. Between 1994 and 1999, only about 155 square km officially registered as mined had been de-mined, but 644 square km were still known to be mined and another 1,400 square km suspected to contain mines.<sup>42</sup> During the late 1990s, efforts to destroy weapons and to remove landmines that threaten the security of individual Cambodians were moderately successful. Between 1999 and 2002, for instance, the government collected and destroyed about 100,000 weapons. Unfortunately, UNTAC was unable to preserve the ceasefire effectively and could not disarm the armed forces of the four Cambodian signatories. While the other factions cantoned about 55,000 soldiers, the Khmer Rouge refused to do so because of factional security reasons.<sup>43</sup> As a result, the other factions refused to comply and sent the soldiers on 'agricultural leave'.<sup>44</sup> Failure to disarm the factions haunted the country until 1998, when it was finally agreed to end the military conflict. Further efforts to demobilize the armed forces are far from meeting expectations.

Collaborative efforts to promote freedom from fear of violent death and subjugation through the promotion of political and civil rights have seemed more fruitful than justice and demilitarization. Cambodia has become more democratic compared to previous periods. There were national elections in 1993, 1998 and 2003, and a commune election in 2002, so that a sustained process is underway. The level of political violence and intimidation against opposition parties has also decreased. During the 1993 election, the number of casualties was about 200, but this level fell drastically in 1998 and 2002. Post-election transfers of power have also become increasingly peaceful, if not faster. According to a report by the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative, the

2003 election 'marked an important step in Cambodia's efforts to establish a multiparty democracy'.<sup>45</sup> With the exception of the violence in 1997, when Second Prime Minister Hun Sen removed First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh by force, the issue of irreversibility appears to be less problematic. Since 1998, only two minor undemocratic attempts have been made to overthrow the government. The international intervention since the early 1990s has made it possible for human rights organizations to spring up, numbering over 40 by 2000. Evidence of political rights violations is now harder to find.

By and large, Cambodian citizens also seem to have become increasingly satisfied with improvements in their political rights and civil liberties. A survey conducted in 2003 reported that citizens 'are more likely now than in 2000 to report they have freedom of political expression and are less likely to worry about direct coercion or other forms of political repression'.<sup>46</sup> This does not mean that Cambodia has now become a mature democracy. The degree of certainty that the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) would win in future elections has grown, and prospects for free and fair elections remain grim. The CPP dominates the judiciary, the security apparatus and the military establishment. Electoral administration remains weak. FUNCINPEC and the Sam Rainsy Party remain too weak to defeat the CPP in elections. Civil society actors, such as the human rights and democracy-related NGOs, are young and vulnerable to state control, unable to do more than monitor the electoral process and report election fraud and irregularities. They lack the political power to ensure a free and fair electoral process. Evidence suggests that diminishing political violence and intimidation had more to do with the CPP being in a stronger position to win in elections.

Collaborative efforts to promote freedom from the fear of want also appear to be relatively successful. From 1992 to 2002, the Cambodian economy performed far better than expected. It grew about 7 per cent per annum in 1995–96 with an average growth rate of 4.6 per cent in 1993–2000.<sup>47</sup> Although it remains a poor country, Cambodia has witnessed overall socio-economic improvement to the extent that its rank in the UNDP Human Development Index was 140th in 1997 (rising from 153rd), just below that of India and Pakistan. By 2001 it had climbed to 121st out of 174 countries. In 2000, its per capita income was estimated to be a lowly US\$271, but Cambodians appear to have grown more optimistic about their socio-economic conditions and economic development. In 2000, 57 per cent mentioned poverty as the biggest problem facing the country, but this had decreased slightly to 52 per cent in early 2003.<sup>48</sup> Overall, the level of 'freedom from the fear of want' remains unacceptably low. In 2003, life expect-

ancy was only 56 years. The number of people living below the poverty line remained at about 36 per cent in 2001, increasing to 43 per cent in 2003. It was estimated that 5.8 out of the 13 million population would still be living on less than \$1 a day in 2005.<sup>49</sup> Economic growth has not been fast enough to absorb the number of people joining the labour force every year, and 'Cambodian families often sell portions of their land to pay for health care, and in the process become landless and/or assetless'.<sup>50</sup> Cambodia received permission in September 2003 to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), but has been warned by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Human Rights in Cambodia that this could impact adversely on human rights, including the right to health.<sup>51</sup> All this suggests a widening gap between rich and poor, as a consequence of economic liberalization without adequate state intervention or protection.<sup>52</sup>

Overall, peacebuilding as a method for the promotion of human security in Cambodia has been relatively more successful than either criminal justice or peacekeeping: with the security support given by the peacekeepers and the active role of UNTAC's Electoral Component, the process of democratic transition emerged: the subsequent elections became freer and fairer and the level of respect for human rights increased noticeably. However, freedom from the fear of violent death and want remains limited. Cambodia thus shows the promise and limits of neo-Kantian internationalism.<sup>53</sup>

Why did the collaborative efforts succeed only in a limited way? First, Cambodia was an extremely difficult environment because of the high level of human and material destruction caused by violent conflict.

Second, the various actors seemed to lack a clear strategy towards promoting human security, and the four approaches of the UN may have worked at cross-purposes. The pursuit of justice against Khmer Rouge leaders obviously made it more difficult for them to disarm and for the CPP to decrease military and security spending. It was no surprise that Hun Sen expressed his reluctance to bring Khmer Rouge leaders to justice, claiming, along with King Norodom Sihanouk, that any attempt to indict Ieng Sary, the foreign minister of the former Khmer Rouge government, would return the country to war.<sup>54</sup>

Third, the UN agencies and other actors have been unable to translate their assistance into overwhelming political influence, although they did much to prevent Cambodia from returning to the politics of the past. After the violence in 1997, for instance, the UN left the Cambodian seat at the General Assembly unoccupied and the UNDP office threatened to cut its assistance to Cambodia.<sup>55</sup> The P-5 in the Security Council also pressured the CPP to hold elections, which took place in 1998. But the

UNDP with responsibility for coordinating electoral activities has not always found it easy to uphold democracy. It was seen as being 'soft' on the Cambodian authorities during the 2002 election, when its electoral team contended that the National Electoral Commission (NEC) had neither the duty nor the legal right to ensure that the 'coverage of the electoral campaign in state-run newspaper and TV' was fair.<sup>56</sup> This position raised criticism about the agency's political role.<sup>57</sup>

Moreover, the legalistic and political engineering from outside may even have contributed to limiting democratic development. Concerned with the Khmer Rouge's chances of returning to power and political instability, the donor community understandably aimed to destroy the Khmer Rouge movement but lent a weak helping hand to the political opposition. The United States has been the only donor willing to provide direct support to the opposition parties, but this action has been criticized as meddling in Cambodia's internal affairs.<sup>58</sup>

Fourth, there have been severe limits to international collaboration. It took the UN about a year after the signing of the Paris Agreements before the pledged national troops were finally deployed in full strength.<sup>59</sup> By then the ceasefire had already collapsed. Several ASEAN states sent in troops to support the mission but failed to do so as a collective force.<sup>60</sup> As of 2004, ASEAN as a regional organization still had no regional peace-keeping force. In peacebuilding, collaboration on democratic institution building has been most positive. For instance, the UNDP's office signed agreements with 12 donors for \$4.7 million during the 2003 election, and its election adviser worked closely with the Cambodian authorities and other donors for the coordination of financial and technical preparation for the elections. Bilateral and multilateral donors have provided help to build election institutions, notably the electoral legal framework, the election administration and the election-monitoring organizations. However, donors were far from united on this front, as they often sent conflicting signals to the country. Some, particularly the United States, preferred a more aggressive method, whereas Japan took a slow approach to democracy building, justifying the need for patience and economic assistance as the means to achieve this objective. States may have weakened their commitments to democracy and human rights, and the UN General Assembly removed the discussion of human rights in Cambodia from its agenda. Japan was alleged to have written a 'weak' resolution on human rights in Cambodia (adopted on 20 April 2004 by the UN Commission on Human Rights). The resolution was viewed as 'a marked contrast' to the UN Special Representative's report to the Commission, which 'noted the continued struggle for democracy, rule of

law and human rights'.<sup>61</sup> Few states in East Asia have, if any, provided assistance for these political activities.

Global collaboration on economic reconstruction has also been positive but still limited. Donors have played an active role in the process of economic liberalization. The World Bank has provided investment project assistance (disbursing \$38.5 million in 2001 alone). However, the market remains unreliable. Foreign direct investment in the service sector grew during the UNTAC period and amounted to close to \$300 million in 1996. After that, it declined dramatically to less than \$100 million in 2001, despite increased political stability. For Cambodia to be able to create more jobs for new entrants to the labour market, it would need about \$500 million per year. Even the country's most dynamic sector, the garment industry (which contributed nearly 80 per cent of all exports) suffered, as the number of factories dropped from 220 in 2000 to 180 at the end of 2001.<sup>62</sup>

Collaboration among the UN and other member states in the field of international criminal justice was minimal. China was a consistent and outspoken opponent of an internationally managed or supervised crimes tribunal, apparently resisting the inclusion of the topic on the Security Council's agenda and working against UN involvement, even if it was by Cambodian invitation.<sup>63</sup> Other states in East Asia, with the exception of Japan, offered the UN little or no support at all. According to Youk Chhang, a leading activist documenting Khmer Rouge crimes, other states 'are not helpful and useful at all when it comes to human rights and war crimes matters in Cambodia ... they seem to think that human rights are about white people or western culture'.<sup>64</sup>

## Conclusion

Developments in security since the end of the Cold War suggest a process that has been chipping away at the foundations of international politics based on self- and collective defence. More analytical attention is being paid to concepts of human security. The number of inter-state wars has decreased significantly since the end of the Cold War, but intra-state threats to human security has received greater prominence. Collective security 'was a miserable failure in the 1930s, was put on ice during the Cold War, and then, like Lazarus, rose from the dead in the Persian Gulf. But it was only a minor miracle'.<sup>65</sup> Future military aggression may be deterred more effectively if more states in the UN system become democratic, and if such a society of states shows a degree of global solidarism in that they 'accept not only a moral responsibility to

protect the security of their own citizens, but also the wider one of guardianship of human rights everywhere'.<sup>66</sup>

Cambodia provides a preliminary case for examining the concept of collaborative human security. Evidence used to 'measure' (for lack of a better word) degrees of human security is based on figures indicating the levels of human freedom from the fear of violent death, political subjugation and want, as well as on individuals' changing perceptions of such fear. The case demonstrates the Cambodian state's lack of competence in meeting the security needs of its people. The UN and other actors made a real, if less than desirable, contribution. After having spent more than \$4 billion over the last decade, they managed to help transform the country ravaged by war into a semi-democracy that remains precarious, in which most Cambodians can hardly make ends meet. But without the assistance the donor community has given to the country, it seems likely that no such progress would have been possible. Without such active intervention, Cambodia would, for instance, probably have remained at war and as 'authoritarian' as both of its former allies – namely Laos and Vietnam – have been to this day.

Collaborative action on Cambodia was evident, but can be enhanced. The biggest challenge found in this country case is that actors in human security tended to do almost everything without giving serious thought to the question of how best to achieve their objectives in a systematic fashion, and without ensuring effective collaborative action. States, regional organizations and non-state actors in East Asia were weak in their commitments to promoting freedom from the fear of violent death and political subjugation. The market is a useful but unreliable actor. This does not mean, however, that the UN, regional organizations, NGOs and the market forces will never be able to take more effective collaborative action on human security. Since the end of the Cold War, several regional organizations, namely the Organization of American States, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and NATO began to engage in human security activities. But organizations in Asia, 'a tightly sovereignty-oriented region',<sup>67</sup> are still unprepared to play this role. Barriers to normative change remain formidable, unless more states in the region become democratic or are unable to resist pressures from the liberal West, or perhaps until more states disintegrate into chaos and violence, such as those in Africa.<sup>68</sup>

Overall, the methods for human security are effective to the extent that they help increase freedom from the fear of violent death, political subjugation and want. More case studies are needed before general insights can be drawn. Collaborative human security is a concept that can be operationalized, based on the proposition that state, interstate

and non-state actors can collaborate on human security activities. Future research may need to consider testing the following hypotheses: (1) the lower the degree of fear rooted in violent death, political subjugation and want, the higher the degree of human security; (2) the higher the degree of consensus on the concept of human security among actors involved in promoting freedom from fear, the higher the probability that they will be willing and able to collaborate; (3) the higher the degree of collaboration, the higher the degree of impact they will have on the promotion of human security; (4) the higher the number of democratic states within a region, the higher the probability that they will reach such consensus; (5) the weaker their ability to resist new norms, the stronger the possibility that states in the region are willing to accept new norms; and (6) the higher the number of internal conflicts and violence and the greater their intensity, the more likely states are willing to accept the norm of cosmopolitan intervention.

## NOTES

1. This modifies my earlier use of 'collective' human security in 'The UN, Peacekeeping and Collective Human Security: From *An Agenda for Peace* to the Brahimi Report', in Edward Newman and Albrecht Schnabel (eds), *Recovering From Civil Conflict: Reconciliation, Peace and Development*, London: Frank Cass, 2002. See also, Stuart Harris, 'Economic Cooperation and Institution Building in the Asia-Pacific Region', in Richard Higgott et al. (eds), *Pacific Economic Relations in the 1990s: Cooperation or Conflict?*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993, p.273.
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3. Paris (see n.2 above), pp.88, 96.
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8. See, David Preston and Don Hubert, 'Towards Freedom from Fear: An Agenda for Human Security', *Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies, Journal*, Vol.21, No.3, July 2000, p.347.
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10. Johan Galtung was probably the first to coin the term 'peacebuilding', in 'Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-building', in J. Galtung (ed.), *Peace, War and Defence – Essays in Peace Research*, Vol.2, Copenhagen: Christian Ejlertsen, 1975, pp.282–304.
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12. See Marrack Goulding, 'The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping,' *International Affairs*, Vol.69, No.3, 1993, pp.451–65; Mats Berdal, *Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars: Arms, Soldiers and the Termination of Armed Conflict*, Adelphi Paper 303, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996; J. Bayo Adekanye, 'Review Essay: Arms and Reconstruction in Post-Conflict Societies', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.34, No.3, 1997, pp.359–66.
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18. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (n.9 above), pp.13, 17.
19. Gregory H. Fox, 'International Law and the Entitlement to Democracy After War', *Global Governance*, Vol.9, No.2, Apr.–June 2003, pp.179–97; Nigel D. White, *The United Nations System: Toward International Justice*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002, pp.173–96; Christopher C. Joyner, 'The United Nations and Democracy', *Global Governance*, Vol.5, No.3, July–Sept. 1999, pp.333–57.
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21. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (see n. 9 above), pp.86, 137–52.
22. Judith Banister and E. Paige Johnson, 'After the Nightmare: The Population of Cambodia', in Ben Kiernan (ed.), *Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia: The Khmer Rouge, the United Nations and the International Community*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies, 1993, p.72.
23. See Sorpong Peou, *Intervention and Change in Cambodia: Toward Democracy?*, New York: St. Martin's Press for the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000.
24. Freedom House, a non-profit, non-partisan organization, which rates political rights and civil liberties separately on a scale of 1 to 7 (with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free), assigned Cambodia a 7 rating on both counts for most of the

- 1979–90 period, *Freedom in the World Country Ratings, 1972 through 2003*, accessed at: [www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm](http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm).
25. Banister and Johnson (see n.22 above), pp.93, 104; Robert J. Muscat with Jonathan Stromseth, *Cambodia: Post-Settlement Reconstruction and Development*, New York: East Asian Institute, Columbia University, occasional paper, 1989, pp.24–5.
  26. United Nations, *Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict*, Paris, 23 October 1991.
  27. *Ibid.*, p.42 (italics added).
  28. *Ibid.*, p.20.
  29. *Ibid.*, p.12.
  30. *Ibid.*, art.15, para.1, p.12.
  31. *Ibid.*
  32. *Ibid.*, p.13.
  33. Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, Thailand, Russia, Sweden, the UK and the United States.
  34. Council for the Development of Cambodia, *Development Cooperation Report, 2000*, Phnom Penh: May 2001, pp.2, 9.
  35. Between 1992 and 2000, the UN system as a whole provided US\$700 million, making it second only to Japan (the largest donor in Cambodia), which disbursed a total of \$787 million bilateral aid in the same period.
  36. Brad Adams, ‘Cambodia Gears Up for Khmer Rouge Trials’, 23 Apr. 2003, *Voice of America News*, accessed at: [www.voanews.com/article.cfm](http://www.voanews.com/article.cfm).
  37. Human Rights Watch, *Serious Flaws: Why the UN General Assembly Should Require Changes to the Draft Khmer Rouge Tribunal Agreement*, New York: HRW, 2003, p.1.
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  40. Michael Reisman, for instance, wrote, ‘The wars in former Yugoslavia provide acutely painful examples of the limited utility of war crime tribunals for stopping wars and making peace. . .[T]he belief that war crimes tribunals as a “magic-bullet” technique for deterring and stopping wars and making peace is unfounded’, cited in Rachel Kerr, ‘International Peace and Security and International Criminal Justice’, in Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond, *The United Nations and Human Security*, New York, NY: Palgrave 2001, p.128.
  41. See, for instance, Stephen Krasner, ‘After Wartime Atrocities, Politics Can Do More Than the Courts’, *International Tribunal Tribune*, 16 January 2001; Funmi Olonisakin, ‘An International War Crimes Tribunal for Africa: Problems and Prospects’, *African Journal of International and Comparative Law*, Vol.9, No.4, 1997, pp.822–35; Alfred P. Rubin, ‘Challenging the Conventional Wisdom: Another View of the International Criminal Court’, *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.52, No.2, Spring 1999, pp.783–94.
  42. *Phnom Penh Post*, 15–28 Sept. 2000, accessed at: [www.phnompenhpost.com/full/papers/is919/is919/cambo.htm](http://www.phnompenhpost.com/full/papers/is919/is919/cambo.htm).
  43. Sorpong Peou, *Conflict Neutralization in the Cambodia War: From Battlefield to Ballot-Box*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. This security-based perspective is empirically supported by other case studies. A study of military operations in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina shows that, ‘in war, no side would agree to give up its most important means of defense’ and ‘a full-scale enforced disarmament is only feasible as long as the security concerns of the parties are met’. The study adds that ‘disarmament is closely linked to the notion of security’ and thus ‘for disarmament to be possible in the context of a multilateral conflict resolution effort, it is necessary that the security needs of the party to be disarmed must be fully and credibly assumed by the multinational force’. Barbara Ekwall-Uebelhart and Andrei Raesky,

- Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina*, Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996, p.153. A study of the peace operations in Somalia also shows that the UN failed because its policy involved efforts to coerce local warlords into submission and shifted from disarmament to confiscation of arms without providing the warring clans any guarantees of security. C. Adibe, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia*, Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1995.
44. Michael Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995, pp.34–5.
  45. UN Doc., A/58/317, 22 Aug. 2003.
  46. Asia Foundation, *Democracy in Cambodia – 2003: A Survey of the Cambodian Electorate*, Phnom Penh (draft, 16 May 2003), p.6.
  47. Sok Hach and Sarthi Acharya, *Cambodia's Annual Economic Review*, Phnom Penh: Cambodia Development Resource Institute, Issue 2, Aug. 2002, pp.14–15, 48–9.
  48. Asia Foundation (see n.46 above), p.21.
  49. 'World Bank warning on investment climate', *Phnom Penh Post*, 13 Apr.–6 May 2004, p.6.
  50. Hach and Acharya (see n.47 above), pp.29, 35.
  51. Peter Leuprecht, 'Situation of human rights in Cambodia', UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/105, 19 Dec. 2003, para.53.
  52. State as well civil society institutions in Cambodia remain extremely fragile. See Sorpong Peou with Samnang Ham et al., 'International Assistance for Institution Building in Post-Conflict Cambodia', The Hague: Netherlands Institute for International Relations, Working Paper 26, May 2004. Michael Pugh also makes an interesting point that, 'The unwavering international commitment to a neo-liberal economic model has rubbed salt into war wounds, damaging the prospects for growth in "legal" employment, markets, and consumption patterns', 'Rubbing Salt into War Wounds: Shadow Economies and Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Kosovo', *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol.51, No.3, May/June 2004, p.2.
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  54. Thomas Hammarberg, 'Efforts to establish a tribunal against KR leaders: discussions between the Cambodian government and the UN', paper at a seminar in Stockholm on 29 May 2001 organized by the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and the Swedish Committee for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia on the proposed trial against Khmer Rouge leaders responsible for crimes against humanity, pp.9–11.
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  56. UNDP Electoral Team paper, Phnom Penh, 1 Feb. 2002.
  57. Rajesh Kumar, 'UN agency condemned for lobbying tactics', *Phnom Penh Post*, 15–28 Feb. 2002.
  58. Andrew Wells-Dang, 'Republican group meddle in Cambodia', *Asia Times Online*, 16 Apr. 2004, accessed at: [www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast\\_Asia/FD16Ae01.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/FD16Ae01.html).
  59. Peou (see n.43 above).
  60. Peou, 'The Subsidiarity Model of Global Governance in the UN-ASEAN Context', *Global Governance*, Vol.4, No.4, 1998, pp.439–59.
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  63. Thomas Hammaberg, 'How the Khmer Rouge tribunal was agreed: discussions between the Cambodian government and the UN: Part I, March 1997–March 1999', unpublished mss [nd], p.3 and Part II, March 1999–January 2001, p.1.
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